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Rationale for the Study of Civilian Protection: 
 
Civilians are noncombatants who by definition, are not on active duty in the 
armed services, nor on a police or firefighting force. Yet civilians often shoulder the 
brunt and brutality of armed conflict around the globe. Throughout the past century, 
measures have evolved to better protect civilians from physical harm during conflict, 
each met with varying degrees of success and failure. One of the more recent 
developments in civilian protection is the norm known as the “responsibility to protect,” 
which simply put, affirms the international community’s right to protect civilians when a 
nation state cannot or will not do so itself. Civilian groups, that is, civil society, were 
instrumental in developing this concept, which arose from a very public debate regarding 
the failure to protect civilians in both Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. 
There is evidence that civilians involved in armed conflict today are dying in 
smaller numbers than in earlier times. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program reports that 
“the average battle-death toll per conflict [involving a state] in the 1950s was almost 
10,000, while the equivalent figure for the new millennium has been less than 1,000. 
These estimates leave no doubt that there has been a huge decline in the deadliness of 
warfare since the 1950s.” 
1
  This measurable progress towards a decline in civilian death 
is a welcome development. However, multiple instances of armed conflict remain where 
civilians are still not sufficiently protected, and the majority of these conflicts involve a 
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 Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the 
Shrinking Costs of War (New York:Oxford University Press, 2011) 166. 
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non-state actor. In this thesis, I argue that conflict involving an armed non-state actor 
(ANSA) is fundamentally different from traditional interstate conflict in so far as the 
methodology of civilian protection is concerned. Therefore, for the norm of civilian 
protection to be appropriately expanded to include ANSA conflicts, it is imperative that 
civil society actors, who have greater access and fewer negotiating constraints than states, 
be treated as partners in the process of norm expansion. 
The loss of civilian life in armed conflict is widely condemned. However, there 
are organized armed groups, both state and non-state actors, which rationalize civilian 
death in terms of the end justifying the means. Although in most societies there is a 
cultural taboo against involving non-combatants in warfare, these groups believe their 
objective is so unique, so imperative, so “justified,” that civilian harm is warranted and 
defensible to achieve their end. For example, the carpet bombing of Dresden in World 
War II and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed tens of thousands of 
civilians, but both were justified by state actors as a necessary means to end the world 
war. Similarly, the kidnapping and death of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics 
were justified by the group Black September as a necessary means to obtain the release of 
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Illustrations such as these demonstrate how any 
group, state or non-state, can characterize their purpose as the exception to the rule 
against civilian harm. 
 As will be shown, the norm of civilian protection has evolved since the 1950s. 
There have been two positive trends concerning civilian death. First, the civilian 
protection norm has become embedded in the international consciousness of decision 
makers when the armed conflict involves state actors. Second, civilian death is actually 
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decreasing when an armed conflict involves state actors only. One can correctly 
hypothesize that the two trends are related. Over time, the more the norm against physical 
harm became embedded, the less physical harm to civilians occurred. There is a different 
outcome, however, when the actors involved in the armed conflict are no longer two or 
more states only, but include an additional party: a non-state actor. Civilians are better 
protected from physical harm when the conflict involves solely state actors. Civilians are 
less protected when the conflict involves non-state actors. 
When a conflict involves the state, civilian death is not sanctioned, but often it is 
permissible or understood as a regrettable outcome. States have codified their 
prohibitions against civilian death to include exceptions. Just war theory holds that 
civilians may not be targeted, but there is an intrinsic understanding that conflict involves 
unintentional harm. “Smart” bombs are designed and marketed to hit an intended target, 
with the implied acceptance that no bomb is ever one hundred percent accurate. The 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (to which the vast majority of states are signatories) affirm 
that civilians must not be subject to attack. They do not, however, address the issue of 
accountability when civilians are inadvertently harmed. In practice, history has 
demonstrated near impunity for a state when it claims a legitimate target was intended but 
regretfully, civilian death occurred. Examples include: the United States’ use of drones in 
Afghanistan; Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza for three weeks in 2008/2009 with 
Israel’s stated goal of halting rocket fire launched by Palestinians in the Gaza strip; and 
the NATO bombings in 1999 as part of Operation Allied Force that led to the withdrawal 
of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, and ended the wars in Yugoslavia of the 1990s. All of 
these are instances when a state, or group of states in the case of NATO, used lethal force 
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against a non-state actor and killed civilians. To date, there have been no legal 
consequences against any of the states involved. 
Conversely, when one party to the conflict is a non-state actor, civilian death is 
never legally sanctioned nor permissible. Several historical events highlight this theory, 
the attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001 being one of the most 
infamous. Although Osama Bin Laden, as head of the non-state group Al Qaeda had 
declared war on the United States in 1998, the attacks on the Pentagon (a United States 
military installation), and the thwarted attacks on the U.S. Capitol (a government 
building), were seen as non-legitimate and labeled terrorism. Armed attacks by other non-
state actors against a state have been similarly categorized: the Tamil Tigers against Sri 
Lankan forces; the Irish Republican Army against British soldiers; Chechen militants 
against Russian forces; and the Lord’s Resistance Army against multiple state armed 
forces. Table 1:1 highlights the differences in perception of civilian death. 
Table 1:1 Difference between Civilian Harm Caused by  







Not sanctioned; but permissible Not sanctioned; not 
permissible 
Decreasing Not decreasing 
Constrained by norms, laws, moral 
obligations that have become 
institutionalized 
Not bound by the usual 






It is imperative to categorize behavior causing civilian death as either lawful or 
unlawful, regardless of identity of the causative agent. The actor responsible for civilian 
death must be held accountable whether state or non-state. However, more needs to be 
done to protect civilians from non-state actors. The decade of relative peace after the 
violence of the twentieth century should not reassure us that similar destruction could not 
occur in the twenty first century. The study and implementation of measures that 
effectively helped protect civilians from state harm can help inform measures to protect 






Research Design  
 
In this thesis, I hypothesize that unless civil society is treated by states (and 
international state-based organizations such as the United Nations) as partners in the 
process of norm expansion, civilian protection in cases involving armed non-state armed 
actors (ANSAs) will remain inadequate. I maintain that civil society can play a crucial 
role in influencing the behavior of non-state actors because civil society has greater 
access and fewer negotiating constraints than traditional state mediators. 
First, concerning access: civil society often operates “on the ground” and within 
the communities affected by an armed conflict. Members have a stake in the outcome, 
and with strategic planning, can build trust with an ANSA in ways a state may not be 
capable of. Second, concerning negotiating constraints: civil society is not bound by the 
same legal treaties nor public image constraints as a state or international state-based 
organization. Whereas a statement such as “we do not negotiate with terrorists” may be 
part of a state’s strategy, civil society groups such as a non-governmental organization 
(NGO), may not have the same restrictions when negotiating. According to Claudia 
Hofman, who has studied the strengths (and weaknesses) of NGOs involved in armed 
conflict, the flexibility of NGOs is another asset. NGOs are often small in size, and able 
to respond more quickly to the rapid change in circumstance so often displayed in any 
conflict. They do not have the multi-layered bureaucracy found within states or large 
international organizations (IOs). “The small network form of organization appears to be 
an advantage as it avoids the feedback loop entailed by a larger hierarchical organization, 
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resulting in lengthy periods of coordination before being able to proceed in 
communication or mediation processes with armed actors.” 
3
  Timeliness and responsive 
contact is imperative in conflict resolution, and flexibility decreases constraints to keep 
positive momentum moving forward.  
There is reliable data to now prove that civilian death has markedly decreased 
since the end of the Cold War, which signaled a decline in both declared war between 
two states, and undeclared war between the superpower proxies.
4
  Civil society played a 
norm entrepreneur role in the formation of this civilian protection norm among states. My 
hypothesis envisions an even larger role for civil society in embedding a civilian 
protection norm within the behavior of non-state actors as well. 
Methodology:    
I have chosen to carefully examine three historical conflicts between a state and 
non-state actors to see whether civil society played a role, and if so, whether their 
activities helped protect civilians. The cases will inform my hypothesis that unless civil 
society is treated by states and international organizations as partners in the process of 
norm creation, civilian protection involving non-state armed groups will remain 
inadequate.  
The three selected examples of armed conflict involving both a state and a non-
state actor are: 
 The state of Uganda vs. the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
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Affiars (Berlin: 2012), 20. 
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 Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, and Jonathan Hall, "Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity, 
Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the Cold War." European Journal of International 
Relations (2009), as referenced in Theo Farrell and Olivier Schmidt, “The Causes, Character and Conduct of 




 The Republic of the Philippines vs. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
 The state of Libya vs. the National Transitional Council (NTC) 
Three geographic locations are specifically represented: North Africa, Central 
Africa, and Southeast Asia. All three conflicts highlight a particular influence of civil 
society or a non-governmental organization in creating and/or reinforcing the norm of 
civilian protection in a non-state actor. In each of the three cases, the following questions 
are asked: 
1. Have civilians been harmed and how much so? I will use statistics 
on civilian death (discussed below). 
2. Was civil society involved and to what degree? What was their 
role? Here I discuss the work of civil society/NGOs and how it affected civilian 
protection.  
3. Did the role of civil society contribute to decreased civilian death? 
Did it help protect civilians?  
I posit that the more civil society participated, the greater the reduction in civilian 
harm. Of note, two of the three conflicts have religious overtones; one is clearly grounded 
in Christian / Muslim hostility (the Philippines); one in declared religious fanaticism (in 
Uganda, but whether the Lord’s Resistance Army is strictly fighting on behalf of 
religious beliefs is widely questioned). This is interesting because civil society groups 
often challenge the belief system, including religious ideology, of non-state actors in 
order to influence their behavior and reduce civilian casualties. 
In only one conflict is the state overwhelmingly viewed as the protagonist – 
Uganda. In the conflict in the Philippines, the state is often portrayed as the protagonist, 
11 
 
but certain subsets of the global population are largely sympathetic to the cause of the 
ANSA, leading to interesting corollary concepts about civilian protection. Lastly, Libya 
represents a conflict where the state was viewed as the pariah (specifically its head of 
state - Colonel Qaddafi.
5
) This case study is remarkable because a sector within civil 
society emerged as the armed non-state actor. Further, as an ANSA, it was the National 
Transitional Council that was able to garner the support of the international community, 
not the state of Libya. Given the advent of the Arab Spring, and recent events in the 
North Africa - Middle East region, it is important to examine how groups within civil 
society mutate to become ANSAs, how they obtain positive recognition from the 
international community, and whether their origins within the civil sector influence rates 
of civilian death during ensuing conflict. 
It is worth mentioning that the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” have been voiced 
publicly during all three conflicts, with all three official heads of state describing the non-
state actor in each conflict as “terrorist.” Several Filipino presidents labeled the MILF a 
terrorist organization; the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, as well as the African 
Union, declared the LRA a terrorist group; and Qaddafi, the head of state in Libya, 
initially branded the civil unrest as terrorist. The issue is relevant because the label 
“terrorist” affects how civil society groups can interact with a non-state actor. One 
example is the Parents Circle, a group of Israeli and Palestinian relatives who have all 
lost loved ones to the conflict in the Middle East. In 2008, they were denied permission 
by Israel to teach classroom presentations about non-violence in the occupied territories 
 
5
  I have chosen to use the spelling “Qaddafi” for the former Libyan head of state’s last name. There is no 
exact transliteration from Arabic, and no consensus exists among news sources as to the English spelling. 
See Eoin O'Carroll, "Gaddafi? Kadafi? Qaddafi? What's the Correct Spelling?" Christian Science Monitor 




because Hamas was then in power and had been classified as a terrorist organization. 
Consequently, NGOs such as the Parents Circle were not permitted by law to interact 
with Hamas, even when the interaction was solely to gain permission for their 
presentations. Restrictions on access to, or dialogue with, an ANSA is an increasing 




 Before proceeding, I will clarify some important terms. 
According to John Keane, civil society “describes and anticipates a complex and 
dynamic ensemble of legally protected nongovernmental institutions that tend to be 
nonviolent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension, both with each 
other and with the governmental institutions that ‘frame,’ constrict and enable their 
activities.” 
6
  Varshney adds that “informal group activities as well as ascriptive 
associations should be considered part of civil society as long as they connect individuals, 
build trust, encourage reciprocity and facilitate exchange of views on matters of public 
concern – economic, political, cultural and social.” 
7
 To be succinct, I define civil society 
as any group with a common interest that does not formally, or informally represent a 
state. Some examples of civil society include religious groups (the Catholic church); 
unions and trade organizations (the International Air Transport Association); non-
governmental organizations (the International Rescue Committee); business groups 
(Chambers of Commerce), and epistemic communities which can influence collective 
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 John Keane, Civil Society, Definitions and Approaches (2009): 1. http://johnkeane.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/jk_civil_sciety_definitions_encyclopedia.pdf 
7
 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Delhi: Oxford 
Uiversity Press, 2002), 46. 
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opinion, such as scholars, scientists, and editorial boards of major news outlets. I will use 
the term civil society when there are multiple entities involved. I will use the term non-
governmental organization (NGO), or international non-governmental organization 
(INGO) when a singular group within civil society is the influential entity. State based 
international organizations such as the United Nations or the African Union are not 
included under the rubric of civil society. 
In this thesis, I refer to the civilian protection regime. In the context of 
international relations, a regime is a “set of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given 
issue-area.” 
8
  Therefore, I define a civilian protection regime as a system with a tripartite 
foundation:  
• laws (including treaties and conventions) 
• norms; and  
• ethics (including religious sanction),  
which, when combined with actors and organizations, serve to protect civilians from 
physical harm.  
The principle known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a newer term and a 
useful example of a norm that has emerged from the civilian protection regime. The 
Responsibility to Protect developed as the global community’s remorseful response to the 
failures of civilian protection in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. The basic 
presumption of R2P is that the state has the primary responsibility to protect its citizens. 
Should the state fail in this responsibility, and/or be the actual perpetrator of harm, the 
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 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in 
International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 1983), 1 
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international community then has the right to intervene and protect civilians. 
9
   More 
than a decade has now passed since R2P gained formal recognition. Although there is 
wide consensus regarding the responsibility to protect in theory, the timing of its practice 
and implementation are widely disputed. 
Another important term to clarify is civilian harm. There are many kinds of harm 
and trauma caused by exposure to armed conflict. Psychological, cognitive and sexual 
degradations of physical health all deserve attention, but this thesis will use civilian 
deaths as a measurable outcome primarily because death is more readily and reliably 
quantified than other types of physical harm. However, even the term civilian casualty or 
civilian death can lead to fierce debate. 
Accurate assessment of civilian casualties is an important component of the 
civilian protection regime. Who counts as a civilian, and when? Recent scholarly work 
has seriously questioned the oft quoted conventional wisdom that 90 percent of victims 
from armed conflict are civilian. 
10
  Disputes over body counts have often produced fierce 
political debate between the actors involved in armed conflict. The discussion is difficult 
and emotive. Certainly, there are instances when civilians are deliberately targeted. There 
are just as surely times when civilian death is unintentional. Soldiers who are themselves 
in harm’s way are asked to react under conditions of severe stress. Politics aside, the 
issue of how many civilians were killed in any conflict is paramount when it comes to 
helping policy makers design protocols and guidelines, both to help guide soldiers’ 
actions, and to protect civilians.  
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 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, (Ottowa: 
International Development Research Centre: 2001) 
10
 Adam Roberts, "Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilian?" Survival 52 (2010): 115-136. 
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One example is the 2003 U.S. - Iraq conflict. There have been several studies by 
NGOs, researchers, and government officials attempting to quantify excess civilian death 
since the U.S. led invasion. One such survey compared mortality rates fifteen months 
prior to the United States-led invasion, with eighteen months after. Researchers 
concluded: 1.) that there were more than 100,000 “excess” deaths, primarily from 
violence; 2.) most violent deaths were caused by airstrikes from coalition forces; and 3.) 
the collection of public health data is possible even during violent, armed conflict. 
11
  The 
conclusions were published in 2004 and caused quite a stir, and bolstered the arguments 
of anti-war factions around the world. Detractors alleged that the study was released 
prematurely to sway public opinion regarding the American presidential elections which 
were then upcoming. The ensuing debate further noted that when it was the victim of 
political violence on September 11, 2001, the United States knew the exact number of 
civilian casualties: 2,973. Yet when it was the perpetrator of sanctioned violence, the 
United States did not have accurate counts of civilian casualties in either Iraq, or 
Afghanistan.  The authors rightly pointed out therefore, that since more than half of the 
reported dead in Iraq were women and children, “it seems difficult to understand how a 
military force could monitor the extent to which civilians are protected against violence 
without systematically doing body counts or at least looking at the kinds of casualties 
they induce.” 
12
 Further, the Geneva Conventions mandate that an occupying army has 
direct responsibility for the civilian population they control.   
Other studies attempting to quantify civilian deaths in Iraq have used the method of 
household interviews, as there was no central Iraq death registry (a common problem 
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 Les Roberts, "Mortality Before and After the Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey." The Lancet 
(2004): 1857. 
12
 Ibid, 1863. 
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during any armed conflict). The studies vary widely in their count, ranging from 128,000 
to 1,033,000 excess Iraqi civilian deaths from March 2003 through 2004. That is a 
discrepancy of nearly 900,000 lives – no small disparity. 
13
  The difference in numbers is 
of vital importance, primarily because each number represents a human being, but also 
because statistics are quoted by those with political agendas. Those supporting the Iraq 
invasion could quote the lower figures; those against the invasion could point to a civilian 
death toll of over one million. Data therefore do matter, and data need to be reliable, 
politically blind, and factually based. If societies have any hope of ever decreasing 
civilian harm, it is important to know which military and peacekeeping strategies are 
effective in protecting civilians, and which are not – and that information must come 
from objective, reliable data. For this thesis, I have chosen to use data from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), an internationally recognized research institution housed 
in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. The Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program has been gathering information on violent conflicts since the 
1970s. “The data provided is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on 
global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how 
conflicts are systematically defined and studied… The ambition of a systematic data 
collection means that the coding rules are very strict, and that the standards are set very 
high for inclusion of information.” 
14
 As defined by the UCDP, an armed conflict is a 
contested incompatibility where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. Battle-related deaths are fatalities that 
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 Maria Karagiozakis, "Counting Excess Civilian Casualties of the Iraq War: Science or Politics?" Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance (2009): http://jha.ac/2009/06/22/counting-excess-civilian-casualties-of-the-iraq-
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14




can be related to combat in a conflict dyad. “This includes traditional battlefield fighting, 
guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks / ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of 
military units, cities and villages etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its 
installations, or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial 
collateral damage in the form of civilians killed in crossfire, indiscriminate bombings etc. 





The act of protecting civilians, often termed international humanitarian 
intervention, is not itself a new phenomenon. Some of the initial Christian thought about 
protection of civilians can be attributed to the just war tradition, credited primarily to St. 
Augustine of Hippo who wrote in the fourth century AD. There are two specific facets of 
just war theory: jus ad bellum (qualifications necessary before participating in a war) and 
jus in bello (right conduct once a war has begun). The three criteria of jus in bello are:  
proportionality, minimum force and distinction. Although all three provide some 
guidance regarding civilian safety, it is the principle of distinction which mandates that 
all warring parties distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. 
16
   “Many of the 
rules developed by the just war tradition have since been codified into contemporary 
international laws governing armed conflict. The just war tradition has thus been doubly 





 For definitions of all terms used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, see 
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Islamic law has also made important contributions regarding civilian protection. 
One of its most eminent scholars, Muhammad al Shaybani, wrote Introduction to the Law 
of Nations in the 8th century. It became an authoritative text on international law (‘siyar’ 
in Arabic) and precipitated further Islamic thinking on the subject. Al Shaybani’s 
teachings cover issues such as conduct during war, treatment of “protected” peoples, the 
question of when fighting is justified, and the treatment of prisoners. 
18
 
 Several individuals further contributed to the growing norm of civilian 
protection.  Hugo Grotius, often considered the father of international law, was a 17th 
century Dutch scholar and statesman who wrote On the Laws of War and Peace. In Book 
III, Chapter 11 of his treatise, entitled The Right of Killing Enemies, in Just War, to be 
Tempered With Moderation and Humanity, he necessitates, “every possible requisite 
precaution to spare the innocent, especially women, children and the aged.” 
19
  Grotius 
was writing his most important work during the Thirty Years War, which eventually 
ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and gave birth to what is now recognized as 
the modern nation-state. 
Anarchy best describes the current world order of nation/states. When war occurs, 
there is no one overarching entity that has the power or the authority to command a stop 
to violence. Realism as a theoretical framework acknowledges that civilians die as the 
inevitable outcome of armed conflict. The harm may not be intentional, but a stark reality 
exists that the security of the state may at times outweigh the security of its citizens. 
Liberalism also sees civilian harm as an unavoidable consequence of armed conflict. 
Liberalism promotes institutions and legal structures through which nation states are able 
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 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, trans. A.C. Campbell (London:1814) 
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to cooperate to help protect civilians, but the power to participate within these institutions 
remains with the state.  
There exists a valid argument that neither theoretical framework fully explains the 
near universal recognition of the need to protect civilians, and the all-too-often failure to 
do so effectively. Additionally, both frameworks have great difficulty rationalizing why a 
state would protect anyone other than a state’s own citizens. Prior to the twentieth 
century, this phenomena was seen rarely, and employed almost exclusively to protect 
Christians from the Ottoman Turks.
20
 Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative of 
protecting civilians as an end in itself had not yet taken hold within the global conscience. 
Kant produced most of his philosophical work in the late eighteenth century. Yet the 
“duty” to protect others would take another two hundred years to become the formalized 
principle we know today as “humanitarian intervention.” 
Constructivism has added to liberalism in a way that enhances our understanding 
of civilian protection. Liberalism supports the extension of human rights principles to 
everyone, regardless of personal connection or membership within a particular 
“community”. Constructivism uses the building blocks of liberal thinking: institutions, 
regimes, and laws; and supplements them with norm theory to better house civilian 
protection concepts.  
Alexander Wendt, a noted proponent of constructionism, identified two of its 
basic tenets: "that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared 
ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors 
 
20
 Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention." in Conflict After the Cold War, 
ed. Richard K. Betts, (New York: Pearson, 2008), 238. 
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are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature." 
21
  Essentially, a 
constructivist might challenge the ideas of state sovereignty, or an individual’s 
nationality, or civilians being afforded special protection. A constructivist makes the 
distinction between our human reality which stems from the natural world, and that 
which has been constructed by humankind. For example, that humans require oxygen to 
live is a natural law. It is not a natural law however, but a social definition constructed by 
humans, to label someone as Brazilian if they were born in Rio de Janeiro. National 
boundaries are solely a human construct. 
Social constructs and norms have the ability to change throughout the years, often 
in the name of progress. Behavior once viewed as acceptable can be deemed immoral or 
illegal decades later. The passage of time has seen the near abolishment of slavery, 
marked decrease in child labor, and the beginnings of genuine equality for women – to 
give a few examples of changes in societal norms. Constructivism has consequently 
become a valid theoretical framework within international relations; one which is able to 
elucidate political events from a more normative perspective than liberalism. One such 
event is the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Dominant 
international relations theory could not explain this monumental moment in history. 
Realism could not account for the intentional Soviet relinquishment of state power. 
Further, the institutions and cooperation so central to liberalism had little if anything to 
do with the fall of the Soviet bloc. A constructivist approach however could explain these 
epic events; modern realities could no longer support a state [a human construct] whose 
social structure was embedded in totalitarianism, dismissive of ethnic differences, and 
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economically chained to an un-winnable arms race. Viewed similarly, civilian protection 
is also primarily a social construct. Nature does not dictate who is killed and who is 
spared during armed conflict. Society does. 
One aspect of constructivism is norm theory. Since my research focuses on the 
norm of civilian protection, a close look at the development of norm theory is essential.  
The decades of the 1960s and 1970s heralded social tumult, not only within society, but 
within international relations as well.  The Cold War was raging, and decolonization was 
having a domino effect. Indigenous societies on the African continent were dismantling 
colonial power structures and forming their own nation states. Political scientists 
followed the field of economics in the hunt for hard data to predict events and change.
22
  
Consequently, empirical research became the gold standard of theory not only within the 
social sciences – but within its offspring - international relations.  However, as any 
professional in the field of psychology or behavioral studies can attest to, human behavior 
has yet to be reduced to singular cause and effect rationalization for any individual, let 
alone a society/state. 
Constructivist researchers injected a social component into international relations 
theorizing. One group elucidated norm theory and subsequently sought to prove the 
validity of norm theory using hypotheses which could be tested and measured 
empirically. In 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink postulated their unique theory of norm 
development and claimed that “norm researchers have made inroads precisely because 
they have been able to provide explanations substantiated by evidence.” 
23
  They 
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described the three stages of the norm “life cycle”: norm emergence, norm cascade, and 
internalization. (see Table 2:1) 
Table 2:1  Stages of Norms  
                        Stage 1                              Stage 2                           Stage 3 
























 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, (1998): 898 
 
Norm emergence describes the first stage, when “norm entrepreneurs” use their 
personal agency to promote political behavior change. “Framing” an issue, now common 
parlance, was considered novel when introduced by David Snow in the 1980s.
25
 Framing 
is a new way of describing an activity whereby norm entrepreneurs educate the elite and 
societal leaders to new ways of viewing an issue. Consider the fairly recent norm of 
nuclear abolition. The No Nukes coalition formed in the 1980s and was an attempt by 
concerned norm entrepreneurs to influence policy makers by warning of the fatal end 
game of nuclear war. Where once the power of atomic weapons had been viewed as 
prohibitive security, the No Nukes model re-framed the issue by highlighting the 
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insecurity caused by nuclear weapons. A new norm emerged, and the general public was 
educated to the potential annihilation inherent in nuclear weapons. However, the norm of 
nuclear abolition never truly reached the “tipping point” wherein, according to Finnemore 
and Sikkink, at least one third of available actors sign on to the new norm. Hence, nuclear 
arsenals remain around the globe.  
The second stage, termed norm cascade, occurs when a critical number of states 
reach the tipping point and begin to adhere to the new norm. Finnemore and Sikkink note 
this generally happens after one third of actors align their behavior with the new norm, a 
form of state “group think.” A cascade then occurs, with new states signing on relatively 
quickly.  
Lastly, stage 3 is norm internalization. At this stage, the norm has become so 
embedded, its legitimacy is assumed and a tacit understanding of expected behavior 
exists. An example here would be the prohibition of slavery in the 21st century. With rare 
exception, and certainly on a state level, human slavery has been abolished as a state 
practice.  
Finnemore and Sikkink further argue that “world time-context” matters in the 
development of a norm, meaning that norms are not independent of global historical 
events. To illustrate this point, consider the new social construct that evolved in the 1990s 
precisely because of two global events; the genocide in both Rwanda and Srebrenica. 
Kofi Annan, Director of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations (UN) at the time 
of the genocides, was haunted by the mass killing. Later as Secretary-General, he asked 
for a new approach as UN protection of civilians in both these instances was a 
catastrophic failure. From this request, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed 
24 
 
as a new social construct. Should the state fail in the responsibility of protecting its 
citizens, and/or be the actual perpetrator of harm, the international community then has 
the right to intervene. R2P takes away state power, and gives power to the international 
community – not in the interest of the international community, nor one individual state, 
but in the interest of individual human beings at risk for harm. This was an entirely new 
construct. 
R2P, while a concept that is maturing, still has serious flaws primarily stemming 
from “rules” concerning the UN Security Council (SC) and the veto power of specific 
states. The majority of the international community can agree on the need to intervene 
and protect civilians (Libya in 2011 and Syria 2012 for example), but any one of the five 
permanent members of the SC still has the power to block a vote leading to concrete 
action. This is an example of a new construct (R2P) inhibited by the old order (Security 
Council veto), and a frustration encapsulated in the words of Rajan Menon: 
The source of this failure is neither a lack of people of goodwill nor a 
surfeit of callousness. Rather, it is the persistence of an international order 
centered on instrumental connectivity rather than the primacy of universal 
obligations that permits sovereign states—willful, protective of their 
freedom of action, and suspicious of supranationalism and binding 




 Civilian protection emerged as a broadly understood norm among states after the 
World Wars of the twentieth century. Millions of civilians were killed, and the numbers 
increase exponentially when counting those injured and displaced. Indeed, as a response 
to this global indifference between soldier and civilian, the preamble of the Charter of the 
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United Nations reads:   “we the people of the United Nations [are] determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind,” 
33
  A norm cascade occurred in 1949 with the ratification of 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
Henceforth, any new member of the United Nations was effectively signing on to the 
notion of the protection of civilians during warfare. The ensuing half century saw the 
internalization of this norm, both legally within what is now the specialty field of 
International Law, and institutionally within international organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) like Human Rights Watch and Witness.  
Thus, the norm of civilian protection has generally followed a typical norm life 
cycle as outlined by Finnemore and Sikkink if one is referring to state behavior. Although 
far from absolute, a norm exists to protect civilians during armed conflict between states. 
There are two exceptions to this argument however. First, specific states, as with specific 
individuals, deem themselves “exempt” from the norm, giving rise to the problem of a 
non-conforming state. Second, states are not the only actors on the stage of armed 
conflict. As I will discuss in depth in the next chapter, civilian protection when armed 
non-state actors (ANSAs) are involved is more problematic than when a state actor is 
involved. True, in the twentieth century, the enormous loss of civilian life was caused 
specifically by states. However, information from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
shows that by 2010 there were thirty active armed conflicts around the globe, in twenty 
five locations, and none of these conflicts involved two or more states only; all involved 
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at least one non-state actor. 
34
  This fact makes clear the need to extend civilian protection 
norms to include the behavior of non-state actors. But at present, the life cycle of the 
norm of civilian protection by non-state actors is largely at stage 1 – the tipping point has 
not been reached, there has been no norm cascade, and there is no broad internalization of 
the norm within ANSA behavior.  
I have established that the civilian protection norm that exists within state actors 
is vastly different than that within non-state actors. A historical accounting is essential to 
explain the disparity. It will inform my hypothesis about the necessary involvement of 
civil society and international NGOs to better protect civilians during armed conflict 
involving an ANSA. 
  
 





Evolution of the Norm of Civilian Protection 
Until the invention of gunpowder, conflict was conducted primarily by hand to 
hand combat. Historically, the “smartest” of weapons may well be the sword, as the 
intended recipient of its thrust was rarely an accidental victim. Gunpowder changed the 
way wars were waged. With longer range weapons came a far greater potential for the 
intended target to be missed – thereby increasing the chance of unintended harm to a 
noncombatant. 
Throughout history there have been attempts to modify warfare in order to 
decrease human loss of life. Sun Tzu is considered one of the world’s greatest strategists 
concerning warfare. His treatise, The Art of War, even though written in 6th century B.C., 
is required reading today at many military institutions. Tzu’s recommendations for the 
conduct of war do not directly address the issue of civilian protection, but he does 
counsel against attacking cities, or large population centers. “Thus, what is of supreme 
importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances; 
the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities.  Attack cities only 
when there is no alternative.” 
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Henri Dunant, a Swiss businessman, came to his concern about civilian casualties 
almost accidentally. He was seeking water rights for a business opportunity in Algeria, 
and decided to appeal directly to Napoleon. Inadvertently, Dunant stumbled upon one of 
the deadliest conflicts of the 19th century, the battle for the Italian city Solferino. In 1862, 
he published A Memory of Solferino, a book in three parts. The first and second describe 
 




the battle itself and its aftermath; “chaotic disorder, despair unspeakable, and misery of 
every kind.”  The third section outlines Dunant’s plan.   
“The nations of the world should:  
 form relief societies to provide care for the wartime wounded;  
 each society should be sponsored by a governing board composed 
 of the nation's leading figures,  
 appeal to everyone to volunteer,  
 train these volunteers to aid the wounded on the battlefield and to  
care for them later until  they recovered.” 
36
 
A committee, then conference was formed to explore the possibility of putting 
Dunant’s plan into action. In 1864 twelve nations signed a treaty, called the Geneva 
Convention, which allowed for the protection of medical personnel treating war wounded 
through use of an emblem – a red cross on a white background. Thus began the 
organization the Red Cross (known today as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross).  The global community did eventually recognize the importance of this specific 
type of civilian protection by awarding Dunant (and an international pacifist, Frederic 
Passy) the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901. Neither man attended the ceremony, nor 
delivered a lecture, and Dunant died a hermit in 1910. But most importantly, this 1864 
Geneva Convention marks the first time nation states, together, agreed to modify the 
conduct of war. 
 Unfortunately, with the advent of two world wars in the twentieth century, gains 
made by the fledgling civilian protection regime were soon lost. By 1945 civilians had 
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been slaughtered by the millions, exemplifying a near complete disregard for civilian 
security by states. The Charter of the United Nations (UN) sought to incorporate lessons 
learned by stating its determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow.” 
37
 Thus occurred formal 
recognition that war no longer neatly complied with the distinction between combatant 
and non-combatant, and in fact, the majority of persons killed during conflict in the first 
half of the twentieth century were non-combatants.  
Although expectations of normative state behavior were being written into the UN 
Charter, it became necessary for the concept of civilian protection to become codified. 
This happened with the Geneva Conventions in 1949. It is Convention IV – “Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War” that most clearly spells out 
international law regarding civilian protection.   
• Civilians are not to be subject to attack 
• There is no destruction of property unless by military necessity 
• Individuals or groups must not be deported, regardless of motive 
• Civilians must not be used as hostages 
• Civilians must not be subject to outrages upon personal dignity 
• Civilians must not be tortured, raped or enslaved 
• Civilians must not be subject to collective punishment and 
reprisals 
• Civilians must not receive differential treatment based on race, 
religion, nationality, or political allegiance  
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• Warring parties must not use or develop biological or chemical 
weapons and must not allow children under 15 to participate in hostilities or be 
recruited into the armed forces  
38
  
 Physical harm to civilians certainly did not cease with the coming into force of 
Convention IV. The global community would soon learn that conventions, declarations 
and treaties meant little without the guarantee of punitive repercussions for offenders. 
Although there are no exact estimates, the three year Korean War killed approximately 
three million people. 
39
 The ten year war between Iraq and Iran throughout the 1980s 
killed more than one million (primarily combatants), and like the Korean War, not an 
inch of land was gained by either side. From 1950 through the 1980s, lethal wars 
continued – the majority of the most deadly between states fighting by proxy during the 
Cold War - or nascent states shrugging off their colonial oppressors in Africa. Regarding 
the war in Indochina, “Vietnamese military and civilian deaths ranged from 1.5 million to 
3.8 million, with the U.S.-led campaign in Cambodia resulting in 600,000 to 800,000 
deaths, and Laotian war mortality estimated at about 1 million.” 
40
  Instability in Africa is 
another cause of civilian death. Although declared interstate conflict on the continent is 
rare, civil wars and intrastate conflict pose a real threat to civilians. There were more than 
70 military coups and 13 presidential assassinations in Africa from 1960 through the 
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 – leading to volatile political situations and uncertainty over who exactly, or 
what faction, had legitimate claim to the state’s right to use force. 
Civilians in Central and South America were not spared the violence. Civil wars, 
proxy wars, insurgencies and state violence all caused the death of thousands, if not 
millions, of non-combatants in Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador, Argentina, Peru and 
Nicaragua in the 1980s. There are no exact figures for civilian casualties. But perhaps a 
phrase attributed to Stalin summarizes the indifference to civilian immunity best, “A 
single death is a tragedy; a million deaths are a statistic.” 
42
 
In the 1990s two major incidents of catastrophic loss of civilian life commanded 
international attention. In 1994, the Rwandan genocide occurred. In the span of six 
months, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis were killed,
43
  this in the age of near instant 
communication and the ubiquitous global media. Further, the majority of deaths were not 
caused by aerial bombardment, where one could reason that dropping bombs on large 
population centers could quickly account for massive civilian casualties. The weapons of 
the Rwandan genocide were primarily guns, machetes, and hate speech broadcast by 
radio. The UN peacekeeping forces stationed in Rwanda (UNAMIR) were little more 
than eyewitnesses, and even had the size of their force initially reduced, despite the 
urgent warnings of their commanding officer, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire. One 
purported reason for inaction was because the Rwandan hostilities were viewed as an 
internal conflict, and UN Security Council Resolution 872 (which established UNAMIR) 
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was limited to peacekeeping. The UN therefore did not initially see justification for 
sending more protective forces. 
The second instance that weighed heavily on the collective global conscience was 
the slaughter of 7,000 - 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in Bosnia in July of 
1995. The UN was held particularly responsible for not preventing this massacre because 
the Security Council had declared Srebrenica a “safe area” in April 1993, and UN 
protection forces were present within days of the mandate. Two years later, this small 
protection unit was quickly overrun by Serbian military, who then murdered all able 
bodied Muslim males. 
Ultimately, these two failures provoked intense international discussion regarding 
the concept of humanitarian intervention – armed intervention into another state, without 
the agreement of that state, to address the threat or actual infliction of grave and large 
scale violations of fundamental human rights.
44
   Civilian protection clearly failed in both 
Rwanda and Srebrenica. Why? That question was ultimately put to the UN General 
Assembly in 1999 by then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.  
Consequently, an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was 
created and issued its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. The shift in focus 
embodied in this document from the concept of state sovereignty to state responsibility 
should not be underestimated. Before this report’s publication, the rights of the state were 
viewed as preeminent. Now the emphasis was the rights of citizens, and the state’s 
responsibility to protect those rights. After 450 years, the Westphalian tradition of state 
sovereignty was being pushed to share its dominant role within international affairs. 
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Rather than focusing on the safety of the state, the responsibility to protect contends that 
the government’s primary duty is the safety of its citizens. “If the government is unable 
or unwilling to fulfill that role, or if it itself is the perpetrator of massive human rights 
crimes, then the responsibility devolves to the international community to act in its 
place.” 
45
 This comes in the form of peacekeeping, or actions undertaken to protect the 
peace. As events demonstrated in Libya in 2011, the international community’s resolve to 
move from abstract responsibility to protect to concrete action has been, and will 
continue to be tested. 
The subsequent creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 
marked another momentous advance for the protection of civilians. Prior to the ICC, 
international law lacked the enforcement ability to hold individuals accountable for the 
most serious international crimes, including harm to civilians. Rather than establishing ad 
hoc tribunals to continually respond to genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, the international community created the ICC to be a standing court ready to 
accept cases within its jurisdiction – with the ultimate goal of prevention. 
46
   
Unfortunately, not all UN member states (including the United States) have ratified the 
ICC, nor are there adequate personnel to investigate and apprehend suspects. But the ICC 
is yet another tool outside of a singular state’s control that can potentially aid in the 
prosecution of those who harm civilians. 
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In May, 2009, the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict was released to mark the 10th anniversary for 
the protection of civilians as a thematic issue. Five core challenges were outlined:  
 enhancing compliance by parties to conflict with international law, 
in particular in the conduct of hostilities;  
 enhancing compliance with the law by non-state armed groups;  
 enhancing protection through more effective and better resourced 
peacekeeping and other relevant missions;  
 enhancing humanitarian access; and  
 enhancing accountability for violations of the law. 47   
In this report UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon noted advances in the civilian 
protection regime, but clearly stressed how much more progress must be made. He was 
blunt in his criticism of both state and non-state actors in their disregard for civilian 
populations, and frequently cited the situation in Gaza in late December 2008 as an 
example.
48
  Ki-Moon noted not only the many incidences of direct civilian harm, but the 
blatant restrictions put on access to humanitarian aid – which further exacerbated civilian 
suffering. Lastly, he also called upon the Security Council (SC) to demand accountability 
from all warring parties, and to use all legal means at their disposal to end impunity of 
perpetrators. 
49
  The Secretary-General recognized an important shift in armed conflict 
today. Most battles are no longer fought between two states. The majority of armed 
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conflict occurring since the 1990s involves at least one non-state actor. It follows 
therefore that if civilians are to be better protected, the international community must 
hold non-state actors as accountable as states for their actions during warfare.  
The Challenge of Armed Non-State Actors: 
Armed non-state actors denote individuals or groups who do not 
legitimately represent a nation/state. ANSAs are:  
(i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their 
objectives, (ii) not integrated into formalized state 
institutions such as regular armies, police or special forces, 
(iii) possess a certain autonomy with regards to politics, 
military operations, resources and infrastructure, and (iv) 
shaped through an organizational relationship or structure 
that exists over a specific period of time (spontaneous 
[protests] would not qualify).
50
 
Armed non-state actors have existed for as long as their counterpart – the 
state. For centuries, armed groups have challenged state authority, and states have 
responded with the goal of preserving that authority. ANSAs have further 
challenged customary law identifying the state as the sole legitimate entity in the 
use of force. States may respond with the use of force, but laws and norms exist 
limiting the use of force by states. The question remains however; how can the 
behavior of non-states be similarly influenced to conform to the norm of civilian 
protection?  Of note, there are ANSAs that voluntarily adhere to the norm 
prohibiting civilian harm. Liberation groups such as the African National Congress 
(ANC) provide a specific example. Although the ANC deliberately took part in an 
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armed struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa, its leadership formally 
renounced civilian targets. 
51
  The purpose of this thesis is to better understand 
ANSAs that do not commit to the protection of civilians. 
Ulrich Schnechener has developed a framework in which to analyze various 
ANSAs, their general characteristics, and their motivation. (see Table 3:1 below)   
TABLE 3:1      Types of Armed Non-State Actors 
52
 Schnechener, (2009) 
 
Some ANSAs are viewed as potential allies in reduction of violence against 
civilians; some as spoilers. Some are motivated by political ideals; some by the goal of 
acquiring territory.  Behavior of these groups is not static, and often groups can transition 
from one category to another, or exhibit a hybrid of descriptors. The objective is not to 
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rigidly classify a non-state group; rather it is to learn about the group’s behavior, 
particularly its violent conduct, and posit ways that behavior might be influenced. As can 
be seen in Table 3:1, ANSAs can use physical violence, psychological violence, or both 
to promote their cause. Strategies that aim to reduce violence must then promote norms 
that address both physical (civilian protection) and psychological (civilian immunity) 
aspects. 
The case studies chosen for this thesis exemplify several types of the 
aforementioned ANSAs: rebels/guerrilla (Moro Islamic Liberation Front); hybrid of 
warlord and Big Man (Lord’s Resistance Army); and a fluctuation between 
rebel/guerrilla and clan chiefs (National Transition Council). Whether the type of ANSA 
makes any difference to NGOs attempting to influence behavior will be discussed in my 
analysis of the case studies.    
ANSAs are not party to treaties; nor are they recognized by the United Nations as 
having a voice at the “official” table. So the Secretary General’s problem (as well as 
society’s) is very real. This critique is well summarized in the 2011 Report of the 
Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka:      
Although non-state actors cannot formally become party to a human rights 
treaty, it is now increasingly accepted that non-state groups exercising de 
facto control over a part of a State’s territory must respect fundamental 
human rights of persons in that territory. Various organs of the United 
Nations, including the Security Council, have repeatedly demanded that 
such actors respect human rights law. Although the Panel recognizes that 
there remains some difference of views on the subject among international 
actors, it proceeds on the assumption that, at a minimum, the LTTE [an 
ANSA] was bound to respect the most basic human rights of persons 
within its power, including the rights to life and physical security and 
38 
 
integrity of the person, and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment. 
53
 
What then would compel a non-state actor to recognize and honor customary 
international humanitarian law, in particular the principle of distinction? Scholars, 
diplomats, in-the-field negotiators, and others have been both asking this question, and 
implementing possible answers into best practice these past five years. The landscape of 
warfare has changed, and traditional means of resolving conflict all too often fail. 
Innovative and constructive approaches are needed to engage players who may have little 
incentive to abide by customary law. If state power is the very thing an ANSA is fighting 
against, the opposing state will likely have little control over the behavior of the ANSA. 
If international organizations like the United Nations are not directly involved in a timely 
and effective fashion, civilians are at risk. Civil society and INGOs therefore have a void 
to fill, and a crucial role to play. They can do this primarily through two means:  
 conflict resolution, thereby ending direct assault on civilians; or 
 norm diffusion – making sure civilian protection becomes the            
standard principle guiding armed operations.  
Claudia Hofman pioneered the research introducing this premise. Prior to her 
research published in 2012, there had been no systematic appraisal of the strengths and 
weaknesses of INGOs in their attempt to engage armed non-state actors. She gives two 
examples of an INGO engaging in conflict resolution: the Center for Humanitarian 
Dialogue with the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia, and the Carter Center in Uganda 
with the Lord’s Resistance Army, and examines the particular work of these INGOs in 
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negotiating a reduction in violence against civilians. Regarding norm diffusion, or the 
penetration of civilian protection into the modus operandi of an armed group, Hofman 
highlights two other INGOs: Geneva Call in persuading Kurdish groups like the PKK to 
stop landmine use; and the global efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to hold all warring parties to the principle of distinction between combatant and 
non-combatant. 
54
  Hofman is blunt in her assessment of both the weaknesses and the 
strengths of INGOs.  
States and international organisations need to recognize the contribution 
that INGOs can make to their policies and priorities… [They] should 
consider awarding limited mandates to specialised INGOs to discuss 
individual issues with armed groups and extending unofficial support to 
selected INGOs in engaging armed actors. With greater support from the 
international community, INGOs’ contributions could become more 
substantial and could complement other ongoing efforts to change the 
behaviour of armed groups. By understanding the individual strengths and 
weaknesses of INGOs, as well as their different goals and practices, it 
could become possible to combine approaches to overcome the 
weaknesses of individual approaches and to achieve a more 
comprehensive strategy for engaging non-state armed actors. 55  
 
Whereas Hofman focuses primarily on the concrete means of civilian protection, 
ie; conflict resolution and norm diffusion, I am interested in two particular attributes of 
civil society and INGOs that enhance these means. INGOs with access to non-state 




 Claudia Hofman, Reasoning with Rebels. Research Paper, (Berlin: German Institute for International and 
Security Affiars, 2012), 1-28. 
55
 Ibid., 6 
40 
 
Lastly, what is also important to the violence-reduction equation is the historical context 
within which each ANSA operates. The time period, as well as the social, political and 
economic circumstances of each armed conflict can all play a role in civilian harm. In the 
following chapter, I use case studies to evaluate why civilians were effectively protected 
in certain armed conflict situations, and not in others. Further, the case studies will help 
determine what role, if any, civil society and INGOs played in that protection.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
Case Studies 
So far, we have traced the history of civilian protection throughout the last 
century. We have concluded that civilian protection has become more effective for 
conflicts involving two states (interstate). Further, we know the vast majority of current 
armed conflict today involves a non-state actor, and statistically, these conflicts tend to 
result in major harm to civilians.  
An interesting study of third party attempts to mediate intrastate conflict 
occurring in African states from 1993 to 2007 communicates the importance of third 
party intervention. Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Croicu and colleagues 
examined 2500 events of peacekeeping during the study timeframe and found that two 
variables had a benign effect on the amount of violence after an intervention. First, 
former colonial powers, which often retain a vested self-interest in enhancing stability in 
a former colony, have a positive effect in reducing violence. Second, international 
organizations (IOs) and NGOs, which may be viewed as more neutral, and instead 
“motivated by general principles that connect to international law, and by a desire to 
cultivate a reputation for being successful in peacemaking,” also have the effect of 
reducing violence. 
56
  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was 
specifically mentioned, as well as Sant’Egidio, an Italian INGO well respected for its 
mediation in armed conflicts. Both entities had access to ANSAs because of their 
reputation and their stated mission, and fewer negotiating constraints led to opportunity 
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to both deescalate conflict as well as spread the norm of civilian protection. My 
hypothesis will test whether civil society and NGOs engaging with ANSAs in the three 
case studies had similar success. In this chapter, I use three case studies, analyzing the 
degree of civilian harm involved, and the role of civil society. I am interested in 
determining whether the actions of civil society groups were instrumental in protecting 
civilians. 
 
Case #1:   The Lord’s Resistance Army vs. Uganda 
 
Historical Context of the Conflict and Extent of Civilian Harm: 
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) began as an armed resistance group against 
the government of Uganda in 1986. The LRA persists to the present day, giving it the 
dubious distinction of causing one of Africa’s most longstanding violent armed conflicts. 
Millions of civilians have been displaced; tens of thousands have died. There have been 
sputtered attempts to resolve the insurgency by four African governments, the African 
Union, the United Nations and the United States. Yet still the LRA remains, weakened 
significantly but active, to continue its reign of terror among the civilian population. 
The history of post-colonial Uganda is similar to that of other African nations. 
Uganda was formerly a territory of the United Kingdom and achieved its independence in 
1962. Until 1986, power and the presidency transferred back and forth between several 
individuals including Milton Obote, Idi Amin Dada, and Uganda’s current president 





  Since then, Museveni is largely credited with 
creating a relatively successful economy in comparison to other African nations. 
1986 also saw the formation of the LRA. Its leader Joseph Kony is from the 
northern part of Uganda known as the Acholi region. Initially, Kony characterized his 
movement as one intending to defend the rights of the marginalized Acholi people. Those 
in the region however, quickly realized that Kony had few political goals concerning their 
welfare.  The LRA instead practiced mass murder, rape, and mutilation to perpetuate its 
terror.  Losing public support, the LRA resorted to the abduction of children to continue 
its operations. “A 2006 study funded by UNICEF estimated that at least 66,000 children 
and youth had been abducted by the LRA between 1986 and 2006.” 
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Important to the history of the LRA is the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. 
Uganda joined Rwanda in intervening militarily in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996 and 1998. During this period, a major 
war unfolded in Congo involving militaries from six African countries and 
a broad array of rebel groups. While much of the fighting was directly 
linked to … the presence of Hutu militias seeking refuge in Congo, all of 
these military forces sought to exploit the rich natural resources in eastern 
Congo for their own benefit.” 
59
   
The effect of these past military exploits remains today. The four African nations 
integrally involved in combatting LRA forces in 2014 continue to be deeply distrustful of 
each other’s motives, which ultimately impedes the LRA’s defeat.  
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Throughout the years, there have been several military attempts to neutralize the 
LRA threat which have all ended in failure. Some would rightly argue that Kony’s 
response to each military deployment seeking his capture has only exacerbated civilian 
harm. In 2002, the Ugandan army launched Operation Iron Fist. Its aim was to crush the 
LRA insurgency. Its ultimate effect was the spread of LRA violence into three 
neighboring countries and the displacement of more than 1.7 million Ugandans. 
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Beginning in 1996, the Ugandan government had set up “protected villages” in efforts to 
reduce civilian harm. By 2004, these villages had morphed into squalid camps housing 
nearly eighty percent of the population of Northern Uganda, as characterized by The 
Resolve, a research and advocacy NGO focusing on the LRA crisis. “Within these camps, 
problems of starvation, poor sanitation, psychosocial trauma, lack of education, 
HIV/AIDS … persisted on a gross level. In 2005, reports revealed that nearly one 
thousand people were dying each week as a result of camp conditions.” 
61
  The camps not 
only failed to protect civilians; the camps, in fact, contributed to civilian death.  
Two important events occurred however, in late 2005. A referral to the 
International Criminal Court by the Ugandan government two years earlier culminated in 
arrest warrants issued for Joseph Kony and four of his top aides. Also, the LRA moved 
the base of their operations from Uganda to South Sudan, then to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), and eventually to Central African Republic (CAR), making 
the LRA not only a Ugandan menace, but a regional threat.  
Negotiations throughout 2006 and into 2008 failed to broker a peaceful resolution. 
Dubbed the Juba peace process (because meetings took place in the new South Sudan 
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capital of Juba), talks between LRA senior officers and the Ugandan government were 
unsuccessful in resolving the conflict. “Hope for a final agreement was sustained by a 
series of intermediary agreements, including one on transitional justice mechanisms in 
Uganda, and by the efforts of special envoys from the US, Europe, Africa and the UN to 
keep the parties at the table.” 
62
  For his part, Kony reportedly ordered the execution of 
his top deputy Vincent Otti for being too in favor of a peace agreement. Kony also failed 
to show for a peace agreement signing ceremony in April 2008. With all factions growing 
frustrated, LRA attacks on civilians resumed. Mediators set a November 30th, 2008 
deadline for Kony to sign an agreement, and in fact, Kony did meet with civil society 
leaders from Northern Uganda on November 29th. Unfortunately, they were unable to 
obtain his signature for a truce. Peace talks ended in failure, and the next wave of LRA 
terror began.  
Operation Lightening Thunder was launched by the Ugandan military mid-
December 2008. With an initial goal of routing LRA forces from Garamba National Park 
in DRC, the operation failed miserably, despite US financial and logistical support. LRA 
reprisal attacks, the so-called Christmas Massacres, killed hundreds of Congolese 
civilians. In the years since, LRA senior commanders have repeatedly been able to elude 
capture by shifting base operations between three countries (DRC, CAR and South 
Sudan), capitalizing on the inability of these three governments and Uganda to coordinate 
their efforts. Of note, there has not been an LRA attack on Ugandan soil since 2006. 
Museveni remains halfheartedly committed to disarmament efforts; as Ugandans are now 
for the most part protected. But he is keenly aware of a possible renewed incursion into 






The Role of Civil Society/NGOs in Civilian Protection: 
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
LRA’s systematic violations of international law, human rights and international 
humanitarian law have resulted in more than 100,000 deaths, between 60,000 and 
100,000 children abducted and 2.5 million people displaced. 
63
  These statistics provide a 
stark reminder of the lethal threat the LRA has wreaked upon the civilian population of 
Central Africa for more than twenty five years. There is now however, a marked decrease 
in fatalities stemming from LRA violence. Themner and Wallensteen, researchers 
focused on armed conflict note: 
In the conflict between the Ugandan government and its allies, and the 
rebel groups LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) and ADF (Allied Democratic 
Forces), the fighting de-escalated in 2012 and did not cross the 25 battle-
related deaths threshold. [emphasis mine]  Both rebel groups are based 
outside Uganda, and Kampala is dependent on the assistance of 
neighbouring governments to be able to confront them… As for LRA, the 
group has split up into smaller units, moving over a large area and 




The threat to civilians directly caused by the LRA is now in its twenty eighth year. 
Civilian death has been greatly attenuated, yet despite the military efforts of four African 
states, the violence continues. With historical precedent as support, civilians 
understandably distrust military intervention as the sole path to lasting protection. The 
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capture, trial, and accountability of Joseph Kony for his crimes, and disarming of his 
troops seems a likelier final solution. 
International NGOs such as Invisible Children, the Enough Project, Human 
Rights Watch, Resolve, Amnesty International, and others have been active in trying to 
end this crisis. In particular, they lobbied the U.S. Congress and the Bush and Obama 
Administrations to become more actively involved in ending the LRA threat. U.S. based 
activist groups took up the anti-LRA cause beginning 2004-2006. The pressure of these 
INGOs to capture Kony and relieve civilian suffering helped push President Obama to 
sign into law the “Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery 
Act” in 2010. As required by this legislation, the Obama administration reported to U.S. 
Congress its “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the LRA” that November. The 
strategy described four main objectives: protect civilians; capture Kony and LRA senior 
commanders; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former LRA fighters; and provide 
humanitarian relief to affected communities. It further outlines “U.S. assistance in 
support of efforts of the government of Uganda and civil society to promote 
comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice and reconciliation in Uganda.”
65
 In 
response to this new American interest, thirty four African civil society organizations 
sent an “urgent appeal to President Obama” in December 2010 calling for the immediate 
implementation of the strategy. They noted the stated goal of increased civilian protection 
and urged the President to place top priority on this goal. The organizations were blunt in 
their assessments of the failures of both UN peacekeepers and their own national armies 
in keeping them safe. Despite the military engagement of four nations, and the presence 
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of UN “blue helmets”, LRA attacks were still occurring and civilians were still being 
harmed. The appeal ended by stating, “we have suffered so much from a war that is not 
our own and have often felt forgotten and ignored by our own governments and by the 
international community. This new strategy has given us hope.” 
66
  Partially in response 
to this pressure, President Obama authorized a deployment of one hundred military 
advisors in October 2011. By year’s end, the advisory force had taken up positions in 
CAR, South Sudan and DRC. Concurrently, the African Union designated the LRA a 
terrorist group in an effort to encourage regional cooperation towards the LRA’s defeat.  
In addition, in 2012 the Lord’s Resistance Army garnered broad international 
public condemnation. Much of this attention was initiated by the release of a video, Kony 
2012, which went viral on the internet and was viewed more than 100 million times. The 
producers of the video were from the NGO Invisible Children Inc. and they listed four 
goals for their campaign: make Kony infamous; increase civilian protection; pressure 
international governments to support regional efforts at stopping LRA violence; and the 
arrest and trial of Kony and his top commanders before the ICC. 
67
  Although an 
American-based NGO, the group has regional offices in Africa, and partners with civil 
society in Sudan, Uganda, CAR, and DRC to implement on-the-ground activities in 
Central Africa. Some of the more novel approaches to civilian protection include 
encouraging defections from the LRA by concrete means: FM radio, defection flyers, and 
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high frequency radio networks. 
68
  The Invisible Children website details the 
organization’s:  
investment in data-gathering since 2010, when it launched the LRA Crisis 
Tracker, broadcasting LRA movements and attacks based on information 
relayed via 71 high-frequency radios. The community reports are vetted 
through regional experts and updated to the tracker twice daily. The 
tracker provides an email subscription service, which Invisible Children 
says is used by state and military officials in the U.S. and central Africa, 
local communities, and other NGOs. 
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Local Civil Society: 
 Civil society in Uganda has also taken on an important role in civilian protection. 
Civilians recognize that the military alone cannot solve the LRA problem for a variety of 
reasons: national armies and their commanders distrust one another; the area of LRA 
operations is remote, densely forested, and often lacks communication capability; and 
LRA soldiers are often men and boys who have been abducted from the very villages in 
need of protection, not recruits who agree with Kony’s ideology. Several Ugandan NGOs 
and religious groups have formed in order to address and exploit these particular nuances 
in the cause of better protection. Some of these are described below: 
Jamii Ya Kupatanisha (JYAK) is the Ugandan branch of the INGO Fellowship 
of Reconciliation and a Swahili phrase which transliterates its name. The group began as 
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peacebuilding, and since 2007, reintegration of childhood soldiers back into society. 
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JYAK has published four training manuals, and has worked with the Ministry of 
Education in Uganda on changing the culture of violence through peace building for 
Ugandan school children.   
Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) has worked in the Great Lakes 
region of Africa since 1995. Its projects include working in the massive camps that have 
become home to millions of refugees seeking safety from the LRA, primarily by “training 
the trainers” in conflict resolution. The group is also involved in Peace Radio, and the 
Women’s Peace Initiative (prior and during the Juba talks).  CECORE played an active 
role in Building Bridges, a program that promotes dialogue between two parties in an 
armed conflict and one which eventually led to an agreement between the Ugandan 
government and the United National Rebel Front II – a truce that holds to this day. 
Because of their experience in negotiating and resolving conflict, they are working in 
both a local and regional capacity to deflate LRA violence. 
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Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) is an interfaith organization 
formed in 1997 as a “proactive” response to the violent conflict in northern Uganda. They 
work using dialogue between opposing factions, reconciliation, and peace building 
strategies.
72
  Concretely, ARLPI contributed to the development of the Ugandan Amnesty 
Act which granted former LRA foot soldiers, themselves often the victims of abduction 
and forced conscription, amnesty under certain conditions. They also brought 
international attention to the plight of the night commuters, children who travel from their 
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remote villages nightly to elude possible abduction by sleeping outside in the streets of 
more populated cities. ARLPI partnered with groups such as Invisible Children, based in 
the United States, and organized a campaign wherein activists slept outside overnight in 
American cities to highlight the insecurity and danger faced by African children daily. 
This example demonstrates a strategic partnership between a grass roots, local NGO and 
a wealthy, international NGO combining strengths to address a specific need –in this 
case, the protection of central African children from roaming LRA units. 
The Acholi Religious Leaders have offered to mediate the situation between state 
representatives and the forces loyal to the LRA multiple times. In 2008, rebel leaders had 
begun negotiations when a Ugandan military offensive drove them into neighboring 
countries, causing the current regional threat. 
In 2010, Archbishop Odama of Gulu (then head of ARLPI) and Anglican Bishop 
MacLeord Baker Ochola II traveled to the U.S. and urged “U.S. officials to end the use of 
force in dealing with the LRA. They cited numerous occasions on [sic] which force did 
not work against the rebel group,” and in fact had led to a backlash of violence against 
civilians. Both men said that they did not oppose the Lord's Resistance Army 
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, signed by President Obama (described 
earlier), but were clear that non-military, complementary strategies were necessary to 
ultimately put an end to the violence. Of note, Bishop Ochola’s daughter committed 
suicide in 1987 after being brutally attacked by the LRA 
73
  giving him unique credibility 
in lobbying efforts as a bereaved family member, religious leader, and an Acholi citizen. 
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Youth United for Environmental Protection and Community Development 
(JUPEDEC), is another such group. As a local NGO operating in CAR, it agrees that 
civil society has played a vital role in the hunt for Kony. Recognizing that the insurgency 
cannot end by military force alone, JUPEDEC acknowledges that the fight against the 
LRA will involve many actors: civil society, the church, the army and local authorities all 
must be mobilized to call for LRA members to defect. “The more we multiply military 
attacks, the more we aggravate the situation of the civilian population; hence the need to 
focus on encouraging defections. The LRA has been in existence for 26 years, and armed 
response has not been able to stop it," Alexis Lewis Mbolinani (JUPEDEC’s coordinator) 
stated in 2012. 
74
  
Civil society leaders from all countries affected by the LRA problem met [in 
October 2013] in Brussels with European and American activists. In a joint statement, 
they called for urgent action to end the atrocities perpetrated by the LRA, and to help 
affected communities recover from years of both psychological and physical trauma. 
"The LRA remains a critical situation in the region," said Archbishop of Kisangani 
Marcel Utembi from the DRC, "In order to overcome this crisis, we need a coordinated 
approach from every actor in the region, and increased support to local organizations 
working to help those most affected."
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 In sum, civil society groups have been involved in the conflict in a variety of 
ways: mediation, advocacy, demobilization, reintegration, transitional justice, and 
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education about safety. According to the U.S. State Department, “more than 12,000 
former LRA fighters and abductees have left the group and been reintegrated through 
Uganda’s Amnesty Commission since 2000. Many more have escaped and returned to 
their communities without going through reception centers.”
76
  More recently, a report 
written by Kasper Agger for the Enough Project entitled Completing the Mission detailed 
further success: 
U.S. advisors and their African partners have made progress in 
significantly reducing LRA attacks, increasing LRA defections, improving 
human security and protection for civilians, increasing intelligence 
collection and analysis, and improving logistics with supply lines. LRA 
attacks have dropped by 53 percent over the past two years, and LRA 
killings decreased by 67 percent from 2011 to 2012. At least 31 Ugandan 
LRA fighters—15 percent of the core fighting force—have defected over 
the past 18 months. The number of defections this year exceeds those of 
the previous two years combined. 
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Examples of direct civil society involvement in partnership with the military 
include tracking the whereabouts of LRA members in the bush and informing authorities; 
putting in place early warning systems to warn neighboring communities by radio of 
approaching danger; and weekly security meetings with both African and U.S. advisors. 
Communication here can be bi-directional: locals adding to intelligence collection, and 
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advisors passing on important information to the local community. All of the above 





Case Study #2: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front vs. the Philippine 
Government 
Historical Context of the Conflict and Extent of Civilian Harm: 
Conflict has existed for centuries on the large island of Mindanau, part of the 
Philippine archipelago. The island was initially settled by Muslim traders in the first 
millennium, long pre-dating the arrival of Spaniards in the seventeenth century. Whereas 
the island of Luzon (home to the modern capital city Manila), and many of the 
surrounding smaller islands were predominantly converted to Catholicism, Mindanau 
remained Islamic in its cultural, religious and political life. Hence the term ‘Moro” has 
been used when referring to the inhabitants of Mindanau. In the 1960s, the government of 
the Philippines initiated a resettlement policy whereby Christians from northern islands 
were moved to the resource-rich south and western part of Mindanau. This government 
intervention is the root cause of the present day conflict in Mindanau. Muslim inhabitants 
were discriminated against, property was confiscated and re-allocated, and Christians 
were heavily favored in terms of the opportunity for employment and advancement. In 
the 1970s, native Muslims reacted to the new Christian elite majority by forming an 
armed resistance group known as the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF). For 
more than three decades now, civilians have lived through alternating periods of armed 
conflict and peace negotiations. 
The worst violence occurred from 1972-1976, during dictator Ferdinand Marcos’ 
presidency, when an estimated one hundred twenty thousand Filipinos were killed and 
56 
 
more than one million internally displaced persons were created. 
78
 Today the conflict 
continues, attenuated, yet still causing civilian harm.  
The Tripoli Agreement, signed in 1976, did quell much of the large scale 
violence, but never provided a complete resolution. The negotiations were sponsored by 
the government of Libya and the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, and agreed 
upon by the Marcos government of the Philippines and the MLNF. However, within a 
year the ceasefire collapsed and a splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) was formed – a less conservative faction of the MNLF representing those 
frustrated by an unfulfilled promise of regional autonomy.  With the Corazon Aquino 
administration of 1986 came new opportunities for real peace. In 1989, legislation was 
passed creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanau (ARMM), but also 
requiring a vote by plebiscite in the thirteen provinces and nine cities of the affected 
portion of Mindanau. Only four of the provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, largely 
because other provinces now had a Christian majority stemming from migration policy 
initiated thirty years before. The MNLF broke off talks with the Aquino government, and 
the next phase of armed conflict resumed. 
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1996 marked yet another peace accord between the chairman of the MNLF, Nur 
Musari, and then president Fidel Ramos. This agreement established the Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development, and set up special zones particularly 
targeted for economic development. In three years, provinces would again be asked to 
join the ARMM. Only one additional province voted yes to the plebiscite. The late 1990s 
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also saw the waning influence of the MNLF (due to its failure to implement economic 
reforms and widespread corruption), prompting the further rise in power of the MILF. In 
April 2000, new president Joseph Estrada declared an “all-out war policy” against the 
MILF for alleged atrocities against civilians. Complicating most armed conflict in the 
Philippines however, is the presence of armed clans whose feuds date back centuries and 
can be mistaken for Moro insurgent activity.  
Unlike her predecessor, the next president Gloria Arroyo issued an “all-out peace 
policy” toward the MILF. This cease fire was broken in 2003 when the Filipino military 
launched a new offensive in Central Mindanau against what was termed criminal 
elements. Talks hosted by the Malaysian government again led to a peace agreement. As 
described by Shiavo-Campo and Judd, “the Government – MILF Joint Ceasefire 
Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JC-CCCH) was tasked to 
monitor any violation of the ceasefire agreement. It was also agreed during the 
exploratory talks to welcome an International Monitoring Team, led by Malaysia, to 





Several countries as well as INGOs serve in this role as international monitors. 
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) is one such organization I will focus on later. 
Presently (2014), negotiations have again resumed between the MILF, which 
claims to represent the Bangsamoro people (the collective name of peoples living in 
Muslim majority Mindanau) and the Philippine government. The current president, 
Benigno Aquino, is now halfway through his six year term and seems committed to 
expending political capital to secure a lasting settlement. For their part, the MILF refuses 
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to lay down their arms until regional autonomy becomes a political reality. Many 
potential spoilers to a firm agreement remain, not the least of which is a possible 
constitutional challenge as to whether Mindanau can legally form independent political, 
judicial and legal systems, yet still remain part of the nation-state the Philippines. 
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Statistically, civilian death has markedly decreased from the 1970s to present day. 
More than one hundred thousand civilians were killed during the first Marcos presidency 
(1972-1976). 
82
 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the armed 
conflict between the Philippine government and the MILF did not meet the threshold 
criteria of twenty five battle deaths to be included in their list of intrastate armed conflicts 
for 2012. That is a positive outcome. Unfortunately for civilians, conflict between the 
Philippine government and other armed groups, notably the radical Abu Sayyaf and the 
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement, did make the registry – with an estimated 114 
battle deaths in 2012.
 83
    
Civilian protection in Mindanau remains a serious issue. Western media have 
chosen to highlight several instances when tourists have been kidnapped and/or taken 
hostage. The instances of harm and death of Filipino civilians receives much less of a 
global spotlight. The looming menace of armed conflict remains an intractable problem, 
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as civilians rightly remember instances of broken cease-fires and renewed fighting in 
2000, 2003 and 2008.  
The Role of Civil Society / NGOs in Civilian Protection:  
While the public stance of the Philippine government concerning negotiations 
certainly plays a major role in engaging the MILF (“all out war” vs. “all out peace”), the 
role of civil society in decreasing civilian harm has also been crucial. INGOs such as 
Nonviolent Peaceforce and Geneva Call were specifically asked to become involved in 
ceasefire monitoring and abolition of landmines respectively. 
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) was formed in 2002 as an organization dedicated to 
the concept of unarmed civilian peacekeeping.  Although based in the state of Minnesota 
in the United States, delegates from forty nine countries representing various sectors of 
civil society met in India for the convening event. Within one year, Nonviolent 
Peaceforce had peacekeepers deployed and on the ground in their first mission in Sri 
Lanka.  
The objectives of NP are fourfold: 
 To foster a lasting peace between warring parties 
 To protect civilians during violent conflict 
 To promote the theory and practice of unarmed civilian 
peacekeeping 
 To develop and train a pool of civilian peacekeepers willing to 
deploy to conflict zones 
Further, Nonviolent Peaceforce abides by three guiding principles: nonviolence – 
weapons will never be carried or used by their peacekeepers; nonpartisanship – NP staff 
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will show no favoritism towards any faction involved in a conflict; and noninterference – 
NP has no preference in the outcome of the conflict.
84
  The overarching goal is reduction 
in violence, regardless of its source. 
Nonviolent Peaceforce was approached by civil society groups operating in the 
Mindanau area of the Philippines initially in 2003. These groups were interested in 
nonviolent methods to assist in resolving what was then a decades-old conflict. After a 
three year consultative phase, NP Philippines was officially launched in 2007. By 2010, 
NP employed fifty nine staff, and was engaged in the following activities: 
• civilian protection to local and international human rights groups; 
• accompaniment of victims of human rights violations and affected population; 
• trainings [sic] in human rights protection and International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL), early warning for affected population and community based organizations; 
• documentation and reporting of human rights violations; 
• regular needs assessments among the affected population, especially Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs); 
• organization and facilitation of dialogues and information-sharing meetings on 
security situation for international diplomats, local civil society organizations and 
representatives of the conflict parties; 
• local and international cease-fire monitoring initiates and structures. 85 
 
NP partnered with local civil society organizations such as Consortium of 
Bangsamoro Civil Society Organizations, Ginapaladtaka (G7), United Youth for Peace 
and Development (UNYPAD), Chrislam, Magungaya Center for Palma Inc., Kadtuntaya 
Foundation Inc. (KFI), Mindanao Peoples Caucasus (MPC), Bantay Ceasefire, 
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Bangsamoro Center for Just Peace (BCJP), Magungaya Mindanao Inc (MMI), Madia 
Center for Peace and Development (MCPD), and CSOs for Peace. 
86
  Because of their 
careful planning and strategic collaborations, NP in the Philippines was able to engage 
both state and non-state actors in their work. 
Given the thirty year cycle of violence/ceasefire/violence, both the Philippine 
government and the MILF agreed to an International Monitoring Team (IMT) in 2004 as 
part of the peace process. A civilian protection component was added in 2009, and that 
year NP accepted the offer to join the IMT. The team primarily consists of non-Filipinos 
to enhance its neutrality. Their focus is to monitor and enforce the latest ceasefire. In 
April 2014, the IMT, which includes both military and civilian contingents, was reduced 
from its original sixty members to thirty six. The draw down in part stems from plans for 
the MILF and Philippine government to sign final peace accords by the end of 2014. 
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Since the region has a history of tenuous cease fires at best, the Coordinating 
Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities also proactively recognized the ability of 
outside individuals and groups to reignite conflict. For centuries, allegiance within the 
Philippine archipelago has often been to one’s clan, not to a national identity. Further, 
“regular” criminal activity exists in the region as elsewhere. To separate out which armed 
clashes accurately involved MILF forces, and which involved apolitical, illegal 
misconduct or rido (clan dispute), the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) was formed. 
AHJAG has four members; two from the MILF and two from the government. Their job 
is to prevent potential spoilers from derailing the peace process, an example of which 
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was AHJAG intervention to win the release of a kidnapped police officer in Mindanau in 
December 2013 - which could have led to flare up of violence. 
As noted above, groups other than the MILF and the Philippine government have 
contributed to renewed violence towards civilians. Just as surely, outside groups can 
contribute towards civilian protection. Geneva Call is another such group and a neutral 
and impartial humanitarian organization dedicated to engaging armed non-state actors 
(ANSAs) towards compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) 
and human rights law (HRL). The organization focuses on ANSAs that operate outside 
effective state control and are primarily motivated by political goals. 
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Geneva Call has been operating in the Philippines since its inception in 2000. The 
INGO’s original focus was the elimination of land mines, which had been used by both 
sides of the conflict throughout its history. The Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a 
Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action is an instrument 
developed by Geneva Call which now has forty three NSA signatories, including three in 
the Philippines: the MILF, the Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanau (RPM), and the 
Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines/ Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex 
Bocayo (RPM/RPA-ABB).  Additional to their work on banning land mines, 
Geneva Call co-organized three trainings [sic] of MILF members on 
human rights and international humanitarian law, including programs 
targeting women and youth. These training workshops were carried out in 
partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 
local civil society actors, including the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies, 
the Southeast Asia Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
(SEACSUCS), and the Center for Muslim Youth Studies (CMYSI). 
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Geneva Call also helped to facilitate the development of a joint 
government/MILF unexploded ordnance clearance program that will be 




In a novel collaboration between the MILF and the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines (GRP), Geneva Call led a mission in 2009 to investigate allegations of 
landmine use by the MILF. As a signatory to the Deed of Commitment, the MILF had 
previously agreed to both internal and external monitoring of the land mine ban. Because 
there are no concrete enforcement mechanisms if an ANSA breaks its commitment and 
disregards the ban, it is adherence to the norm of landmine prohibition that holds the 
ANSA accountable. Of note, Nonviolent Peaceforce, as a trusted nonpartisan NGO, 
accompanied the mission team in its investigation. Ultimately, the team found that AP 
landmine use had occurred, but was not able to irrefutably identify the perpetrator. A 
member of the mission team, Eric David, Professor of International Law at the Free 
University of Brussels and legal and fact-finding expert, said, “As far as I am aware, this 
is the first time in the history of international relations that such a fact-finding mission 
has been carried out with the agreement of, and facilitation by, both parties to an armed 
conflict, in casu, a State and a non-State actor.” 
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The increased civilian protection offered by two international NGOs as illustrated 
in the conflict between the Philippine government and the MILF is exceptional. First, to 
have a purposefully unarmed “force” providing protection to civilians is distinctive. This 
ideal recalls the one-to-one protection afforded to Central American potential targets for 
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assassination by groups such as Witness For Peace
91
 in the 1980s. It is also an ideal that 
has attracted the attention of policymakers in recent years. Both the United States 
Institute for Peace and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research held 
conferences on the practice of unarmed civilian peacekeeping in 2012. Practitioners from 
the field in both Sudan and the Philippines placed an:  
emphasis on the need to integrate civil society into UN peacekeeping 
efforts on a collaborative basis, as different actors have limitations and can 
complement each other. Speakers pointed out that unarmed civilian 
peacekeepers often have an enhanced knowledge of and access to local 
communities, which facilitate their interaction with different stakeholders 
at the local level … and stressed the necessity for both local and national 
strategies to find political solutions and address the causes of conflict. 
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 Second, an INGO (Geneva Call) led the mission to investigate possible landmine 
use. This unique circumstance provides an example of how a specialized INGO can 
render unique services that ultimately increase civilian protection. Again, since an ANSA 
cannot be a signatory to a ban on landmines, Geneva Call filled the void in both creating 
the Deed of Commitment, and working towards the accountability of all parties involved 




 Witness For Peace was a NGO that provided accompaniment to individuals who were targeted for 
assassination in Central America during the civil wars in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Those 
providing accompaniment were often Americans with the rationalization that the targeted person would 
be better protected if a U.S. citizen were present as an observer. 
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Case Study # 3:    Libya vs. National Transition Council 
Historical Context of the Conflict and Extent of Civilian Harm: 
The beginnings of the Libyan conflict center largely in what has popularly been 
known as the “Arab Spring.”  Set off by the overthrow of Tunisian president Ben Ali, and 
fueled by the call for Egyptian president Mubarak’s resignation, Libyans began publicly 
expressing their discontent in early 2011. By October 2011, the conflict had formally 
ended, and Colonel Qaddafi was dead. 
Muammar Qaddafi deposed then King Idris I in 1969 in the “bloodless coup.” 
Qaddafi immediately abolished the Libyan Constitution, and enunciated his political 
philosophy in The Green Book, published in 1975. In theory, Qaddafi attempted to form a 
direct democracy through a system of people’s committees and the indirectly elected 
General People’s Congress. In practice, the committees proved little more than a reward 
system for Qaddafi supporters and loyalists. Political opposition parties were outlawed, 
and there was no freedom of the press as both the media and internet service providers 
were state run. Labor unions were prohibited. Non-governmental organizations were 
allowed to exist, but at a minimum, were indirectly connected to the Qaddafi regime. 
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Of note, Qaddafi himself held no real title within Libya, having “resigned” in 1977. The 
official leadership was the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (“the state of the 








For all its shortcomings, there were enormous gains in the lives of most Libyans 
during the Qaddafi years. According to a United Nations International Children’s 
Education Fund (UNICEF) report in 2009, Libya had: 
 a buoyant growth rate, with GDP having risen from $27.3 billion 
in 1998 to $93.2 billion by 2009 according to the World Bank; 
 high per capita income (estimated by the World Bank at $16,430); 
 high literacy rates (95 per cent for males and 78 percent for 
females aged fifteen and above); 
 high life expectancy at birth (74 years overall; 77 for females and 
72 for males); and 
 a consequent ranking of 55 out of 182 countries in terms of overall 
“Human Development”. 
106
   
Despite these gains, Libyans were aware of the marked disparity in wealth 
between the Qaddafi family and close loyalists, and the average Libyan. According to the 
International Crisis Group: 
an important element of Libyan public opinion, at least, had come to see 
things differently and, instead of comparing present conditions to the past, 
compared them instead to the impressions they have of conditions in other 
oil-rich Arab countries. Given a population of a mere six million, many 
Libyans believe their country ought to resemble Dubai.
107
     
Indeed it was this exact economic inequality that Qaddafi himself initially tried 
capitalize on by blaming “the government” in January 2011 for the housing shortage and 
encouraging Libyans to take what was rightfully theirs. Popular unrest, awareness of 
current events in Tunisia and Egypt, and the arrest of an admired lawyer Fathi Terbil in 
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Benghazi all combined to lead to the first public demonstrations against the state in mid- 
February 2011.  The Libyan conflict was born. 
February 17
th
 2011 had been marked by the Muslim diaspora as “The Day of 
Rage,” the anniversary of the publication of a Danish cartoon perceived as an insult to the 
prophet Muhammad. Libyan opposition groups capitalized on this sentiment and began 
calling for massive public demonstrations around the country to express a deeper 
discontent with the current economic and political situation. Protests happened in several 
cities, including Benghazi and Tripoli, and protestors were fired on by police and security 
forces. The conflict escalated over the next week, and confirmed reports of aerial 
targeting of civilians by government security forces soon garnered worldwide attention. 
(Although Western media was characterized by the International Crisis Group as one 
sided, there were several global news outlets reporting on the rioting, looting and burning 
of official state buildings by the protestors also.)  Ahmed Jibril, a Libyan diplomat who 
joined the protesters, explained: 
Qaddafi’s guards started shooting people in [sic] the second day, and they 
shot two people only. We had on that day in Al-Baida city only 300 
protesters. When they killed two people, we had more than 5,000 at their 
funeral, and when they killed fifteen people the next day, we had more 
than 50,000 the following day …. This means that the more Qaddafi kills 
people, the more people go into the streets. 
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 By February 26
th
, acting with unusual alacrity, the United Nations Security 
Council unanimously approved Resolution 1970 – notable because it marked the first 
time a state had been referred to the International Criminal Court. Further, Resolution 
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1970 implemented an arms embargo, restricted travel on certain regime members and 
froze assets. Key to the resolution’s unanimity was the defection of the Libyan 
ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi, who convinced other Council 
members to vote in favor. In public statements, Dabbashi  went on to:  
thank Council Members for their unanimous action, which represented 
moral support for his people, who were resisting the attacks.  The 
resolution would be a signal that an end must be put to the fascist regime 
in Tripoli.  He launched an appeal to all the officers of the Libyan armed 
forces to support their own people and renounce their support for 
Muammar Al-Qadhafi, whom he called ‘criminal’ and whom he said was 
prepared to go to extremes to keep up the repression. 
109
   
On March 17, 2011 the U.N. deepened its commitment to the Libyan opposition 
by passing Resolution 1973  which explicitly stated civilian protection as its goal. Ten 
Security Council members voted in favor; none opposed; and five, including permanent 
members Russia and China abstained. Resolution 1973 authorized a “no–fly zone” over 
Libya and approved “all necessary means” to protect civilians, except by a foreign 
occupying force. Within days, French forces and others had crippled the Libyan air 
capabilities, allowing the opposition to survive and gain crucial support. On March 31
st
, 
NATO officially took over operational command of the no-fly zone, legitimizing the 
intervention as an international effort rather than that of a singular nation. 
Who exactly comprised the Libyan opposition at this point? It is a difficult question to 
both quantify and qualify. The most well-known opposition unit was the Libyan Islamic 
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Fighting Group. However, also battling were every day Libyans who made up the self-
proclaimed National Liberation Army, “young men — students, artists, athletes, doctors, 
lawyers and yes, some Islamists — (who) left their homes to take on Gadhafi's army. 
Their strength was thought to lie in their diversity, in their willingness to fight and to die 
for the right to live outside of Gadhafi's brutal autocratic grip.” 
110
  Ultimately, the 
various factions of the opposition melded into what became known as the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) – united in their demand for the ouster of Qaddafi, and goal 
of new Libyan leadership.  
By June, 2011, the conflict had become a stalemate. Gains and losses were traded 
by both sides over the summer, with control of Tripoli the perceived yardstick of victory. 
This happened on August 22 when opposition forces took the capital. Politically, 
important recognition of the NTC as the de facto government of Libya came from the 
United Nations and the World Bank less than a month later, in September.  
Qaddafi was killed by extrajudicial means on October 20, 2011, formally marking 
the end of the conflict. Subsequently, the NTC gained increased international recognition 
as the governing entity of Libya, giving the interim council badly needed public, financial 
and political support.  The revolution was over, and the difficult task of rebuilding and 
governing Libya began. Once the armed conflict had subsided, the new Libya could lay 
down its weapons, and take stock of its loss. 
 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, one-sided violence is the use of 
armed force, by the government of a state or by a formally organized group, against 
civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.  During the eight months of armed 
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conflict between the government of Libya and the National Transition Council, estimates 
of civilian death span a range from 2422 civilian casualties according to the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, 
111
 to several thousands of civilian casualties caused by Qaddafi 
forces, the thuwar (revolutionary forces) and NATO combined as measured by the UN 
Human Rights Commission on Libya.
112
 The wide disparity may exist because the 
Uppsala group requires confirmation from two sources before including a death in their 
data set. 
The Role of Civil Society / NGOs in Protection of Civilians:  
The Libyan conflict started out as civil society’s peaceful protests over a dictator’s 
absolute grip on power. Initially, civilian Libyans were not armed. But as the state’s 
response to protests became more violent, civil society’s counter response saw an 
exponential increase in civilian participation, some of whom chose to arm themselves. As 
established, most conflict today involves a non-state actor. However, the designation of 
non-state actor does not always follow a neat algorithm. The Libya/NTC conflict 
highlights this issue, and is important because segments of civil society quickly joined the 
armed group to create a council (the NTC) comprised mainly of civil society actors.    
The resistance fighters gradually organized themselves into geographically 
rooted militias (or kataeb), each led by a single military commander, who 
was often recruited from the ranks of defectors from the national army. 
Communication constraints prevailing in the early phase of the conflict 
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prevented the kataeb from fusing into a unified military structure with a 
single chain of command. 
113
  
In essence, sectors of civil society became the armed non-state actor – the 
National Transitional Council. By the first week of March, 2011, the National 
Transitional Council had established itself as the principal coordinating group of the 
rebelling factions. The Council was made up of a wide swath of civil society: activists, 
lawyers, academics, former military, persons representing political prisoners, 
businessmen, and its initial president was the first high ranking defector from the Qaddafi 
regime, the Minister of Justice.
114
   
The NTC was complemented by a military council set up to coordinate 
armed activities that oversaw at least some of the opposition troops. As the 
conflict progressed, the NTC affirmed its commitment to International 
Humanitarian Law [IHL] by issuing ‘codes of conduct’ on the treatment of 




Thus, as a non-state actor comprised of segments of Libyan civil society, the NTC 
was able to influence the behavior of its members through norm diffusion. The “rules of 
conflict” were disseminated among the thuwar both verbally and in print. Further, the 
Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Libya determined that the 
organization of the thuwar and the intensity of the violence gave rise to a non-
international armed conflict which triggered the application of international humanitarian 
 
113
 Kubo Macak and Noam Zamir, "The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to the Conflict in 
Libya," International Community Law Review 14 (2012):408. 
114
 Dan Murphy, "The Members of Libya's National Transitional Council." Christian Science Monitor, 
September 2, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0902/The-members-of-Libya-
s-National-Transitional-Council.2011 
115
  Kubo Macak and Noam Zamir, "The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to the Conflict in 
Libya," International Community Law Review 14 (2012):409. 
72 
 
law, and more specifically Protocol II and Common Article 3.  On March 19, 2011, an 
international coalition joined the conflict and began employing force through aerial 
targeted bombing to enforce Resolution 1973. Because of this, the Commission found 
that the necessary elements of an international armed conflict had also been fulfilled. The 
Commission further concluded that this was legally separate from the non-international 
armed conflict, and was thus a “co-existing international armed conflict.” 
116
 The 
terminology concerning the Libyan conflict is important both legally and academically. 
The determination of co-existing conflicts holds all parties accountable: the government 
of Libya as a signatory to various treaties and conventions; NATO as an “instrument” of 
the United Nations in this context, and the NTC as a non-state party to an armed conflict 
that if it were to receive formal recognition, would want to be viewed as observant of 
common international humanitarian standards. 
NGOs played a role in mitigating civilian casualties both during the active phase 
of the conflict, and its aftermath.  As early as April of 2011, three Libyan experts began 
conducting workshops in Eastern Libya to help community leaders build civil capacity, 
reaching over one hundred eighty participants. The core training revolved around how to 
effectively plan, implement and monitor relief and development programs. The NTC had 
recently established a committee to oversee humanitarian activities, and civil society was 
beginning to organize its response regarding the effects of the armed conflict on a civilian 
population, as well as its hopes for the future of Libya. NGO projects at this point tended 
to focus on emergency relief, and assistance for displaced persons.
117
  As the war 
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progressed, NGOs active both inside and outside Libya began to fill the civil vacuum. 
The New Libya Foundation is one such group, and was founded very early on in the 
conflict (February 25, 2011). Its mission is to “nurture the successful development of 
civil society organizations in Libya through training, education, access to resources and 
financial assistance. Our vision is broad with our immediate focus on: civic engagement, 
inclusiveness, and association.” 
118
 The Foundation has also set up an “Incubator Center” 
which organizes networking events for Libyan civil society to meet and interact with 
government officials, international organizations, funders and other elites. This is 
important because although the new Libya has a General National Congress comprised of 
elected representatives, the bulk of the work and decision making regarding political life 
comes from local councils. Sadat el-Badri, chairman of the Tripoli Local Council, says 
that while he classifies his organization as "government" more than "civil society”, he 
admits that seventy to eighty percent of the activity is done by NGOs. 
119
 As a fledgling 
democracy, participation by civil society is essential. Without the rule of law, new 
political structures, and a civil society empowered as a true stakeholder in the future of 
Libya, the country could devolve back into conflict and chaos. NGOs serve an important 
role in moving forward. Libyan Human Rights Solidarity and the World Organization 
Against Torture (OMCT) are two such examples. Khaled Saleh, Secretary General of 
the Libyan Human Rights Solidarity group visited the eastern city of Benghazi in August 
of 2011. Although based in Switzerland, Saleh saw that: 
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As an organization, it was important to be present and to work inside Libya 
in order to promote the culture of human rights on the largest scale. At the 
moment, we have an office in Benghazi that has started to organize 
conferences and training courses to raise Libyans’ awareness about human 
rights. We will organize the first training course for a group of lawyers, 
jointly with the Cairo Institute for Human Rights. 
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Libyan Human Rights Solidarity was also actively involved in training rebels in 
international humanitarian law, specifically the treatment of prisoners from Qaddafi’s 
forces. Similarly, the World Organization Against Torture began its work in Libya in 
1996, focusing on the maltreatment of prisoners. Since the 2011 revolution began, “it has 
been accompanying civil society in fighting against torture and supporting legal reforms.” 
121
  More recently in 2013, the NGO organized the workshop Uniting Public Institutions 
and Civil Society to Monitor and Implement the New Law Against Torture: Challenges 
and Prospects. The workshop was in response to the Libyan General National Council 
passing new laws forbidding the use of torture and prohibiting forced disappearances, 
common practices during the Qaddafi regime.  
 Lastly, the well-known international non-governmental organization ACTED has 
been operating in Libya since early 2012. Its main office is in Tripoli, although there are 
thirty nine national and two international staff spread throughout the country. Two of 
ACTED’s main projects are to “support the emergence and development of civil society 
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Libyans under the age of forty have only ever known political life under a dictator. 
Freedom of the press, freedom to assemble, and freedom of association are all nascent 
concepts for two generations of Libyans. The advocacy and skill-based training provided 
by ACTED and other NGOs not only help fill a void in political and civic life, they are a 
barrier to a return to authoritarian rule. 
As reflected in the discussion above, the role of civil society in Libya has been 
more important post-conflict than during the seven months of actual heavy fighting. 
During the active phase of armed conflict, top priority was placed on physical security, 
and the link between civil society and decreasing civilian death was relatively weak. 
Instead, civil society has been developing the vital capacity to reduce future conflict. As 
stated prior, NGOs in Libya were not allowed to exist unless they were sponsored by a 
member of Qaddafi’s family or political ally. Political parties were outlawed. Free speech 
was nonexistent. Further, throughout Qaddafi’s forty year rule, there were no independent 
human rights organizations or other civil society groups. 
123
  Since the end of the Libyan 
conflict, thousands of NGOs have been formed, representing the interests of a wide swath 
of Libyan civil society. These NGOs are necessary in their work to involve ordinary 
Libyans in government institutions and decision making. In the aftermath of the 
revolution, armed militias were the groups with the most influence over newly elected 
public officials. Guns then held more sway than ballots. Currently, in 2014, armed 
factions within Libya are still fighting each other, although the battle related death 
threshold of twenty five has not been reached. NGOs play a vital role in tempering the 
violence and providing alternatives to weapons as a means to settle dispute. Many NGOs 
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working on governance, rule of law, and democratic ideals offer hope for an alternative 
future. In this way, Libya is setting precedent for other post-conflict transitions involving 
an armed non-state actor.  
The 2011 situation in Libya further provided a test case of whether the United 
Nations would be held accountable for its 2009 recommendations regarding protection of 
civilians. Security Council Resolution 1973, passed on March 17, 2011 had the express 
intent of protecting civilians. Its language clearly invoked the Responsibility to Protect 
paradigm.  
The Security Council … expressing grave concern at the deteriorating 
situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties, 
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the 
Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear 
the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the 
protection of civilians, … Demands the immediate establishment of a 
cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and 
abuses of, civilians; 
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 The frenzy of diplomacy and relative speed with which the UN passed Resolution 
1973 in 2011 marked a stark departure from the inaction of the United Nations in 
Rwanda in 1994. Widespread protests had begun in Libya in mid-February. Within a 
month the international community acted, approving a no fly zone over Libya and 
authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians. Later in 2011 however, the 
international community did not take similar decisive action in Syria, where armed 
resistance groups were demanding the ouster of President Assad. Instead, the U.N. 
Security Council deadlocked, and could not reach a unanimous vote regarding 
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intervention. There were legitimate questions as to whether civilian protection was the 
sole reason for international intervention in Libya, and critics alleged that the ouster of 
Qaddafi was the true primary objective. In part because of the removal of a head of state 
from power, Russia and China declined to authorize another U.N. Security Council 
resolution permitting international involvement in Syria similar to Resolution 1973 
concerning Libya.  
The conflicts in Libya and Syria both started out as peaceful protests by civil 
society. The estimated civilian death in Syria between March 2011 and April 2014 is now 
more than 190,000 persons.
126
  From 2012-2014, the number of civilian deaths in Libya 
did not meet the threshold mark of twenty five to be included in the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program. Scholars and policy decision makers continue to debate whether the swift 
decision by the United Nations Security Council sanctioning international intervention in 
Libya led to the relatively short lived armed conflict there. It is certain however that 
ultimately, Libyan civilians were better protected, and through a variety of instruments: 
 the U.N. Security Council basing its intervention on principles contained 
within  the Responsibility to Protect paradigm 
 various sectors of civil society who then became the armed non-state actor 
were made aware of international humanitarian law during armed conflict. 
This gave the insurgency a legitimacy both within the civilian population 
that they would be rightly protected if the ANSA did indeed seize power 
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from state forces, and within the international community that the NTC 
was a serious entity committed to basic humanitarian principles 
 the rise of non-governmental organizations, post-conflict, focused on 
governance and rule of law in a country that previously had few to none. 
The Libyan conflict, like most modern conflict, was a complex situation with 
rapidly changing events. As the U.N. Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry 
on Libya has documented, all actors within the conflict caused civilian death. However, it 
was the National Transitional Council itself, as the ANSA, which allowed for the 
opportunity for the creation of civil society groups and NGOs. Non-withstanding the 
external pressure from the international community during war, ongoing pressure from 
NGOs and civil society groups helped lead to internalization of the norm of civilian 






Conclusion and Recommendations: Towards Better Protection of 
Civilians 
 
The vast majority of today’s armed conflicts involve at least one armed non-state 
actor.  Decreasing armed conflict and its pursuant harm to civilians is a common goal 
shared by the global community. I argued in this thesis that any approach to decreasing 
civilian death during armed conflict must thus include engaging non-state actors.  
Civil society and international non-governmental organizations (I/NGOs) have a 
unique and crucial role in influencing the behavior of a non-state actor. If the norm of 
civilian protection is to be appropriately expanded to include conflicts involving armed 
non-state actors, it is imperative that civil society actors, who have greater access and 
fewer negotiating constraints than states, be treated as partners in the process of norm 
expansion. 
Civilian are less likely to die and more likely to be better protected physically 
when an armed conflict is state – state. Conventions, international law, and the norm 
expansion of protection guaranteed to civilians have all contributed to this positive 
outcome since World War II. When the armed conflict involves a non-state actor, 
however, civilians remain at higher risk for death. The challenge therefore is how to 
expand the norm of civilian protection to encompass the behavior of armed non-state 
actors (ANSAs).  
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Civil society and international NGOs can assist in the process of norm expansion 
to ANSAs. First, they have fewer constraints placed upon them than state actors. NGOs 
have their own mission and by-laws. They are accountable to a board of directors or 
similar entity, not a nation/state, nor government agency. Whereas the state may have the 
publicly declared policy of non-negotiation with non-state actors (or substitute the nom 
de guerre “terrorists”, “rebels”, or “insurgents” here), it may well be the explicit mission 
and role of an international NGO to negotiate with the non-state actor – thereby relieving 
the state from this function, and allowing a specialized NGO or specific sector of civil 
society to take on this vital role instead.  For example, in Colombia, “the President 
officially appointed the Catholic Church as channel for negotiations with the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), despite this group's presence on [terror 
watch] lists maintained by the United States and the EU. [Another example is the case of 
third party mediators engaging in] regular talks with all sides of the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict, including Hamas.” 
127
  
In this thesis, I focused on three case studies to test the hypothesis that civil 
society and NGOs are necessary interlocutors in conflict involving a non-state actor. 
Civil society assists in expanding the norm of civilian protection in a variety of ways, 
access to ANSAs and fewer negotiating constraints being two of the most crucial. Each 
of the case studies below clearly illustrates the role that civil society and international 
NGOs were able to take on because of decreased negotiating constraints: 
1. In the conflict between Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), it 
was civil society leaders who met directly with senior LRA representatives 
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to try to broker a peace agreement in 2008. This occurred after the Juba 
peace process between the LRA and the Ugandan government collapsed.  
2. In the Philippines, where successive administrations refused 
communication with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), two 
specialized INGOs are involved in negotiations and ceasefire monitoring. 
Nonviolent Peaceforce is playing an active role in unarmed civilian 
peacekeeping, and meets with representatives of all sides of the conflict to 
discuss and review standards of international humanitarian law. The 
second INGO, Geneva Call, is engaging ANSAs in two ways: negotiating 
with ANSA leadership to become a signatory to the Deed of Commitment 
for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for 
Cooperation in Mine Action, and leading the de-mining efforts in the 
Mindanau area.  
3. The case study of the conflict between Libya and the National Transition 
Council (NTC) is unique, but presents clear evidence for the role of civil 
society in negotiations. Members of the Libyan government defected and 
became de facto members of civil society. Ahmed Jibril, a Libyan 
diplomat; Ibrahim Dabbashi, Libya’s ambassador to the United Nations; 
and Moustafa Jalil, former Minister of Justice turned first head of the NTC 
are three such examples. In my definition of civil society, I included 
epistemic communities which can influence collective opinion. These 
former governmental elites each went on to help negotiate an end to the 
conflict by engaging with both the international community, and the 
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National Transition Council; soliciting the former for political support and 
assistance to end the fighting, and influencing the latter to uphold 
humanitarian law.  
The second crucial manner in which civil society and international NGOs assist in 
the process of norm expansion to ANSAs is through access. INGOs have entrée to the 
non-state actor not always granted to states or their representatives. Some NGOs are 
already an established presence in the geographical area of conflict. They may have an 
existing relationship with the ANSA, or members of the ANSA, that precedes the armed 
conflict. Other NGOs rely on their reputation to gain entre’, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Still other NGOs have a specialized service or skillset that 
the ANSA may see as desirable. All the above qualities can open the door to 
communication, build trust, and improve access, as illustrated in the case studies below:  
1. In the conflict between Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
civil society and Ugandan NGOs had access to the LRA because they live 
and work in the communities most affected. Civil society is instrumental 
in tracking LRA movement and attacks, and reporting this information via 
radio to authorities and neighboring communities to prevent further 
civilian harm. The INGO Kony 2012 was instrumental in building the 
infrastructure necessary for radio communications. Additionally, several 
Ugandan NGOs fill the role of assisting former LRA soldiers to 
demobilize and reintegrate within their communities. 
2. In the Philippines, the INGOs Nonviolent Peaceforce and Geneva Call 
both gained access to the MILF over time and by gaining trust. Both 
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organizations are committed to neutrality and nonpartisanship within the 
conflict, exhibiting these values over the test of time. Further, both groups 
had national and international staff; the national staff are known members 
of the community who were vested in ending the conflict within their own 
community, and international staff enhance impartiality. 
3. The case study of the conflict between Libya and the National Transition 
Council (NTC) is again unique because the armed non-state actor arose 
from civil society. Of the members of any given Libyan community, some 
chose to take up arms, others chose to start NGOs. They had access to 
each other because they knew, worked and lived with each other under 
Qaddafi’s rule. Organizations such as Libyan Human Rights Solidarity 
and the World Organization Against Torture trained and worked with the 
opposition forces regarding humanitarian law. Hundreds of other NGOs 
formed once the NTC made clear that the formation of Libyan NGOs 
would be welcomed; many of them focusing on governance and rule of 
law. 
On the other hand, international “terrorist blacklists” can limit civil society and 
I/NGO access to an ANSA. The inclusion of an individual or an organization on an 
international watch list is often not a transparent process, and thus open to political 
influence. There are also no “gradations” within lists, which can lead to confusion, and 
can be counterproductive in two ways. First, INGOs functioning as interlocutors with an 
armed non-state actor may find their funding from states and other organizations in 
jeopardy. Second, ANSAs which may have renounced arms, and which may be the very 
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groups likely to engage in negotiations, are treated in the same way as groups 
perpetrating active campaigns of terror. The Iranian opposition group, the People's 
Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) provides one such example. They sought to be 
removed from European terror watch lists for years. Despite evidence that the group had 
ceased military action since 2001, and rulings in favor of the PMOI by both the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities and the Proscribed Organisations Appeal 
Commission, the listing stood until 2009 for the EU, and 2012 for the United States. 
128
  
Caution should be taken with regard to the prohibition of engaging or interacting with 
ANSAs. This can lead to entrenched positions, exacerbate the conflict at hand, and 
ultimately lead to more civilian harm, which was especially true in the case study of the 
Philippine / MILF conflict. Lack of access also blocks the dissemination of norms that 
promote civilian protection. 
Civil society and NGOs play a further role in resolving armed conflict because 
they generally lack an agenda other than an end to that conflict and decrease in civilian 
harm. A state’s foremost responsibility is the security of its citizens, but competing 
interests may interfere with that obligation. Similarly, armed non-state actors rarely have 
civilian protection as the sole reason for the formation of their group. For example, the 
African National Congress was formed to fight against apartheid policies, which in 
essence would help protect black citizens, but its formation was not solely for the 
protection of civilians. Organized parties do not take up arms exclusively to protect 
civilians from arms. The state and/or non-state actor in any armed conflict usually has 
other interests, whether that be political power, territory, or economic gain. The agenda 
of a neutral third party in an armed conflict, whether civil society or an INGO, is 
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altruism: that of assisting in norm diffusion and preventing civilian harm. Therefore, it is 
critical that the NGO be viewed as impartial and objective.  “The perceived independence 
of INGOs from the control of other entities, particularly national governments, often 
increases their credibility among armed actors.” 
129
  In the three case studies, all of the 
NGOs and sectors of civil society highlighted took great care to put civilian protection as 
their primary objective. They may each have a unique mission, whether it is de-mining 
efforts or reintegrating child soldiers, but the end goal is common – decreased civilian 
harm. 
In spite of their contributions, NGOs also have attributes in need of improvement 
in order to increase their effectiveness.  Civil society and I/NGOs have no “legal” 
authority to make decisions, or enforce decisions once agreed upon. This lack of 
authority is a double edged sword. Lack of legal authority can devalue the role of 
I/NGOs, and make it more difficult to entice engagement with the ANSA. However, lack 
of legal authority can potentially enhance the moral authority of I/NGOs, as moral 
authority relies on altruism in its origin, and not external directives. An example is the 
Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for 
Cooperation in Mine Action, conceived by the INGO Geneva Call. There are no legal 
ramifications for an ANSA if it does not sign onto the Commitment. Geneva Call cannot 
ban them from international organizations. Nor will they likely be held accountable in the 
Court of Justice. ANSAs understand that Geneva Call has no jurisdiction over their 
behavior. They sign the Commitment because they recognize the altruism inherent in 
Geneva Call’s endeavors, and want to increase their own moral authority within both the 
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relevant civilian population and the global community by adhering to standards of 
international humanitarian law. 
Another challenge posed by the civilian protection work of I/NGOs is the issue of 
personal or institutional ego. If the success or failure of negotiations is specifically tied to 
one individual, or one organization, there exists the possibility that the success of the 
individual or entity will override the success of the goal of civilian protection. Egos can 
be a real barrier to negotiations. Situations where the norm of civilian protection 
supersedes all else are preferable. The model posed by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) is a good example. The names of the individuals involved in 
negotiations or meetings are seldom made public, nor are the findings of the ICRC, 
except in rare instances. The focus is always on all parties abiding by international 
humanitarian law. 
Two other issues are important to civil society and I/NGOs being treated as 
partners in the process of norm expansion: trust and resources. It takes time to build trust 
if the non-governmental organization is not well known to the various warring factions. 
ANSAs may be suspicious of INGO personnel with whom they do not have a 
relationship. Questions as to an NGO employee’s true identity and purpose may arise. 
Conferring trust is a process that must be respected as impartiality, neutrality and 
discretion are qualities integral to a relationship with ANSAs. 
Lack of resources represents a significant challenge to the work of INGOs. If only 
the global community allocated as many resources to those entities engaging in conflict 
resolution and norm diffusion using non-military means, as those employing the military. 
During fiscal year 2012, the United States Department of Defense budget (not including 
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Iraq/Afghanistan wars) amounted to more than 500 billion USD,
130
 compared to 2.78 
million USD operational expenditures for Geneva Call. 
131
  More funding for 
organizations that do the concrete work of conflict resolution and norm diffusion is 
imperative. An increase in financial support can: train mediators, place more aid workers 
on the ground educating ANSAs and increasing awareness of international humanitarian 
law, support unarmed peacekeeping, purchase hand held radios, radio towers and 
communication capabilities, fund de-radicalization and de-mining programs; as well as 
the many other ways civil society and INGOs strategically adapt to each armed conflict in 
order to enhance civilian protection. 
Civil society and INGOs play a unique and crucial role in influencing the 
behavior of a non-state actor. “Governments, international organizations and NGOs 
should thus not squander the opportunity of integrating NSAs into international law... 
Instead, it seems promising to keep communications channels open, in order to convince 
NSAs of the necessity of maintaining civil rights standards. Neither the exclusion of these 
actors nor their demonization can bring an end to the suffering of the civilian population 
– on the contrary.” 
132
 The resolve of the international community to adequately protect 
civilians was put to the test after WWII. By and large, civilian death decreased in 
state/state conflict. The resolve of the international community is again being tested; this 
time concerning conflict that includes a non-state actor. My hypothesis demonstrates that 
to expand the norm of civilian protection to include conflicts involving armed non-state 
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